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Inside or Outside the System?
Eric A. Posnert & Adrian Vermeulett
In a typical pattern in the literatureon public law, the diagnostic sections of
a paper draw upon political science, economics, or other disciplines to offer deeply
pessimistic accounts of the motivations of relevant actors in the legal system. The
prescriptive sections of the paper, however, then issue an optimistic proposal that
the same actors should supply public-spiritedsolutions. Where the analyst makes
inconsistent assumptions about the motivations of actors within the legal system,
equivocating between external and internalperspectives, an inside/outsidefallacy
arises. We identify the fallacy, connect it to an economics literature on the "determinacy paradox," and elicit its implicationsfor the theory ofpublic law.
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INTRODUCTION

Imagine a paper about constitutional theory that offers the
following argument: "All officials are ambitious, and thus prone
to maximize their power. To solve the problem, judges should
adopt the following rules of constitutional doctrine . . . ."i The

natural reaction would be to ask whether the diagnosis in the
first sentence covers the judges as well; if it does, the prescription in the second goes wrong by assuming public-spirited motivations on the part of the judges who are asked to supply socially beneficial rules. Parallel questions arise, mutatis mutandis, if
the diagnosis is not that officials are ambitious, but that they are
self-interested in some other way, or are partisan, or ideological.
There are two ways of understanding what has gone wrong
in this sort of argument. One might say that the problem is one
of incentive compatibility: the diagnosis rests on an account of
the officials' motivations that is inconsistent, at least prima facie, with the motivations that must be present if the theorist's
solution is to be supplied by those very officials. At a deeper level, however, the problem is that the theorist is skipping back
and forth between two different perspectives: an external perspective that attempts to explain the behavior of actors within
the constitutional order as an endogenous product of self-interested
aims, and an internal perspective that assumes the standpoint
of the judge and asks how the judge ought to behave so as to
promote the well-being of the constitutional system and the nation. In cases of this sort, the analyst is not doing ideal theory,
which asks simply what well-motivated officials should do. Rather the analyst is combining ideal with nonideal theory in an
incoherent way, positing nonideal motivations for purposes of
diagnosis and then positing idealized motivations for purposes of
prescription.

1 See, for example, Julian Davis Mortenson, Executive Power and the Disciplineof
History, 78 U Chi L Rev 377, 385 n 27, 425 (2011) (claiming that the Madisonian theory
of separation of powers rests on "the recognition of human ambition" as opposed to "selfless patriotism," yet also assuming that judges will use judicial review to promote the
common good) (emphasis omitted). These two views can be reconciled only by the further
assumption that judges are not human.
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The hypothetical example is crude in the extreme, but we
believe that legal theory is rife with examples that have essentially the same structure and are only somewhat more subtle
and difficult to identify. We will thus attempt to identify and illustrate a problem or class of problems-the "inside/outside fallacy"-that appears with some frequency in the theory of public
law. The inside/outside fallacy occurs when the theorist equivocates between the external standpoint of an analyst of the constitutional order, such as a political scientist, and the internal
standpoint of an actor within the system, such as a judge2
although there is nothing unique about judges in this regard,
and we will see examples in which the internal standpoint is
that of some other type of official. This equivocation yields a
kind of methodological schizophrenia. In a typical pattern, the
diagnostic sections of a paper draw upon the political science literature to offer deeply pessimistic accounts of the ambitious,
partisan, or self-interested motives of relevant actors in the legal
system, while the prescriptive sections of the paper then turn
around and issue an optimistic proposal for public-spirited solutions.
Our point is not substantive or empirical. It is not to argue
for, or against, any particular assumptions about the behavior of
judges, other officials, or other legal or political actors. Rather it
is strictly a point about consistency-the consistency of assumptions and perspectives. The increasing cross-fertilization of legal
theory with economics and political science, while highly beneficial for all these fields, creates a methodological risk. The risk is
that the analyst will implicitly make one set of assumptions in
one part of an argument, taking an external perspective, while
implicitly making different and inconsistent assumptions in another part, taking an internal perspective. Our aim is to clarify
the nature of this risk, to explain why it tends to arise, and to
show how it may be prevented.

2
On the difference between internal and external perspectives, see, for example,
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 86-88 (Oxford 1961); Richard H. Fallon Jr, Constitutional Constraints, 97 Cal L Rev 975, 995-1002 (2009); John Ferejohn, Positive Theory
and the Internal View of Law, 10 U Pa J Const L 273, 279 (2008). Law professors may of
course play either the role of the analyst, as when they attempt to explain judicial behavior, or the role of an actor within the system, as when they argue cases or write briefs as
amici curiae. The latter activities may blur the difference between roles as a practical
matter (and in some cases that blurring is precisely the point). Yet as a conceptual matter, the distinction never blurs. Law professors may switch hats very rapidly, or try to
wear two hats at once, but that behavior is irrelevant to the conceptual distinction we
draw.
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The inside/outside problem is not unique to legal theory.3 It
is just that other disciplines understand the problem and make
best efforts to avoid it. There is an instructive parallel in the
history and theory of welfare economics; here is a stylized version. At Time 1, welfare economists assume a benevolent government that attempts to maximize some social welfare function. These economists offer public-regarding advice to
government officials based on the assumption that those officials
will implement the advice, if they find it persuasive about where
the public interest lies-based, in other words, on the internal
standpoint of a government assumed to be well motivated.
At Time 2, however, a new breed of public choice economist
expands the scope of economic theorizing to include the government officials themselves. These public choice economists endogenously derive the behavior of officials from standard economic postulates, usually by assuming that officials are both
rational and self-interested. It then becomes painfully apparent
that the social welfare harms arising from self-interested official
behavior cannot be remedied by offering public-regarding advice
to those same officials, as in the old welfare economics. If the diagnosis offered by public choice economics is correct, the officials
will not be listening to public-regarding counsel as such. The only sort of advice to which the officials might listen, even in principle, is a suggestion that the officials have mistaken where
their own self-regarding interest lies. The analyst must accqunt
not only for the demand side of the problem (what solution a benevolent social planner would desire to institute) but also for the
3 Similar problems arise in Marxist theory. There is a standard tension between
the external perspective of scientific socialism-according to which revolution becomes
inevitable in the presence of certain economic and social conditions-and the internal
perspective of political activists, who are committed to bringing about revolution for
normative reasons and through intentional action.
The horns of the dilemma are well known. Either the laws of history operate
with such iron necessity that political action is superfluous-communism will
somehow come about "by itself' without propaganda, leadership, or mass action-or, if this view is discarded, as it must be, political action must be guided
by values.
Jon Elster, An Introduction to Karl Marx 189 (Cambridge 1986). The standard response
to this tension is that the role of the revolutionary activist is to "shorten and lessen the
birth-pangs" of the inevitable future. Karl Marx, 1 Capital:A Critique of Political Economy 15 (Charles H. Kerr 1915) (Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, trans). That formulation in turn creates further problems; for discussion, see Elster, An Introduction to
Karl Marx at 189-90 (cited in note 3). For an alternative attempt to resolve the tension,
see G.A. Cohen, History, Labour and Freedom: Themes from Marx 55-75 (Oxford 1988).
Thanks to Professors Jon Elster and Mark Tushnet for guidance on these issues.
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supply side of the problem (who will have the incentives to supply that solution, given the analyst's diagnosis of the problem).
In the literature on welfare economics this insight goes by
the name of the "determinacy paradox."4 If the analyst endogenously derives the behavior of actors within the system for purposes of diagnosis, the analyst must also endogenize those actors' response to any advice the analyst might give. If the
analyst stands outside the system for purpose of diagnosis, it is
inconsistent to assume an internal standpoint for purpose of
prescription, with the narrow exception of strictly instrumental
advice about how rationally self-interested actors may best promote their interests. Our principal claim is that legal theory
needs to absorb the insights of the determinacy paradox.5
Part I illustrates the inside/outside fallacy in three different
settings: Madisonian arguments that assume power-maximizing
behavior by officials or institutions in the lawmaking system
(Part I.A); partisanship arguments that assume partisan behavior on the part of officials (Part I.B); and process-theory
arguments that assume prejudiced behavior by majorities,
self-entrenching behavior by incumbent officials, or rent-seeking
behavior by organized groups (Part I.C). Across these settings,
we will see legal theorists drawing on the external standpoint of
political science literature with devastating effect, then abandoning that standpoint to offer public-spirited advice to officials-especially judges-whose motivations that same literature brings into serious question.
Part II turns to debates surrounding presidential power and
prerogative. We detect versions of the inside/outside fallacy in
4 The original source is Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Richard A. Brecher, and T.N. Srinivasan, DUP Activities and Economic Theory, in David C. Colander, ed, Neoclassical Political Economy: The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities 17 (Ballinger 1984).
For extensive consideration, see the articles in a symposium in 9 Econ & Pol 205 (1997).
5 For an earlier effort along these lines, see Adrian Vermeule, Self-Defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers, 75 Fordham L Rev 631, 636-40 (2006). For legal
scholarship that is sensitive to the relevant problems, see, for example, Scott Baker and
Anup Malani, The Problem of Rational Courts (unpublished manuscript, June 2012) (on
file with authors) (arguing that if courts are as rational as the actors they regulate, certain legal rules turn out to be inefficient); James E. Fleming, Toward a More Democratic
Congress?, 89 BU L Rev 629, 639-40 (2009) (critiquing proposals to improve Congress by
means that require congressional approval); Mark Tushnet, Some Skepticism about
Normative ConstitutionalAdvice, 49 Wm & Mary L Rev 1473, 1474 (2008) (arguing that
outside advisors on constitutional design will be ignored if their counsel does not align
with the incentives of local actors); Mark Tushnet, Self-Historicism, 38 Tulsa L Rev 771,
772 (2003) (critiquing historicist analysis of constitutional law when used to support
normative recommendations to judges).
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several common ideas in the relevant literatures. One is the
trope that, where emergencies require presidential action inconsistent with law, presidents should violate the law, openly declare the violation to the public, and seek some sort of ex post
ratification-a regime we call "responsible illegality." Another is
the idea, exemplified by Justice Robert Jackson's opinion in Korematsu v United States,6 that judges should decline to interfere
with military action in wartime, but should also refuse to make
a decision that upholds the military action, for fear of creating a
bad precedent. Both of these arguments commit the same mistake, which is to imagine that presidents or judges can take actions that somehow stand outside the constitutional system and
will thus have no precedential effect inside that system. On the
contrary, whatever presidents and judges do creates a precedent
to which the future may point; there is no escaping the system
from within. Although it is not initially obvious, this turns out to
embody the same sort of mistake highlighted by the determinacy
paradox, or so we will suggest.
Part III turns to the legal literature on interpretation and
adjudication, while Part IV discusses the literature on international law. In both settings, we identify examples of the inside/outside fallacy that arise because of inconsistency between
the empirical premises that analysts or actors propound about
(other) actors within the system, on the one hand, and the normative proposals that analysts or actors offer on the other. In
cases such as Bush v Gore,8 for example, initial decision makers
attempt to make one-off decisions with no precedential value,9
but the attempt fails. The initial decisionmakers try to make a
nonprecedential decision because they fear that downstream decisionmakers will use the precedent for ends the initial decisionmakers do not want, but they overlook that the same motivations will cause the downstream decisionmakers to ignore the
instruction that the initial decision should be treated as
nonprecedential.
In Part V, we distill the themes of our critique and indicate
its limits. Diagnosis of the inside/outside fallacy requires logical
consistency between the behavioral assumptions underlying the
analyst's diagnosis and prescription. In itself a requirement of
6
7

8

9

323 US 214 (1944).
Id at 246 (Jackson dissenting).
531 US 98 (2000).
Id at 109.
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consistency has few substantive implications, in the sense that
there is usually some logically consistent combination of assumptions to justify almost any argument about constitutional
design and interpretation. Yet some such combinations will
simply be implausible and will thus be ruled out by evidence if
not by logic. And in any event the very exercise of making the
assumptions consistent has a disciplining effect. It should no
longer be possible to combine pessimism about diagnoses with
unexplained optimism about solutions, as so much legal theory
does. In a brief conclusion, we suggest that awareness of the
fallacies we discuss underscores the difficulty of combining external political science with internal legal scholarship in a coherent way.
I. MADISONIANISM AND ITS COMPETITORS: AMBITION,
PARTISANSHIP, AND PROCESS FAILURES

Constitutional theory endlessly rings the changes on
themes of ambition, partisanship, and political-process failures. Analyses that invoke these concepts are a fertile environment in which the inside/outside fallacy may breed, because the
temptation is to diagnose problems by impeaching the motivations of officials or other political actors, then to propose solutions that rest on high-minded premises about the motivations
of whoever the analyst is asking to supply the solutions. In this
Part we offer examples of this fallacious two-step procedure.
It is not as though ambition, partisanship, and process failures are three different topics. The connections are numerous
and complex: ambitious people may promote their ends through
partisan or interest-group activity; parties are ambitious both as
institutional actors and as vehicles for the individual ambitions
of their members; parties are to some extent merely coalitions of
interest groups; and so on. Nonetheless, we separate out the
three concepts in order to track different bodies of literature that
have distinct, albeit overlapping, emphases. Ambition, both individual and institutional, is the focus of a literature adumbrating and critiquing James Madison's famous argument in Federalist 51 that a properly designed system of checks and balances
will make "[a]mbition . . . counteract ambition."o Partisanship is

the focus of an enormous literature in American political science,
10 Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist347, 349 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E.
Cooke, ed).
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with particular emphasis on legislative-executive relations during periods of divided or unified party government; legal scholars have usefully arbitraged this literature to critique the Madisonian view." Finally, exploitation of minorities by majorities,
self-entrenchment by incumbent officials, and rent-seeking by
interest groups are the focus of literatures in political economy
and public choice theory. We will take up these three strands of
public law theory in turn, identifying the inside/outside fallacy
in its native habitat.
A. Madison and "Madisonian" Judging
A number of recent contributions have clarified the Madisonian account of checks and balances.12 Heavily influenced by
the Scottish Enlightenment ideas of Adam Ferguson and Adam
Smith,1 Madison's Federalist 51 sketches an invisible-hand theory of the relationship among lawmaking institutions under the
proposed federal Constitution.14 What makes Madison's theory
an invisible-hand theory is that he does not suppose that officials in the new lawmaking institutions will be motivated to
pursue the public interest, however defined. Rather they will be
acting to promote their individual ambitions; those ambitions
will be tied to the long-run interests of the institutions they staff
("[t]he interest of the man must be connected with the [ ] rights
of the place"); and the result will be a system of institutions
competing with each other to promote their interests.15 The point
of such a system is to prevent tyranny, defined as the accumulation in a single institution of all legislative, executive, and judicial powers. The invisible-hand system of institutional competition, in other words, produces liberty as a byproduct of
individually and institutionally self-interested behavior-just as
11 See Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties,Not Powers,
119 Harv L Rev 2312, 2330-47 (2006).
12
See, for example, N.W. Barber, Self-Defence for Institutions, 72 Camb L Rev *11
(forthcoming 2013), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2162129
(visited Nov 24, 2013); Eric A. Posner, Balance-of-Power Arguments and the Structural
Constitution *2 (University of Chicago Institute For Law & Economics Olin Research
Paper No 622, Nov 2012), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=2178725 (visited Nov 24, 2013); Adrian Vermeule, The System of the Constitution
38-43 (Oxford 2011).
13
See generally Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (Edinburgh 1966); Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Modern Library 1776).
14 See Vermeule, The System of the Constitution at 38-43 (cited in note 12).
15 Federalist 51 (Madison) at 349 (cited in note 10).
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actors in competitive markets, like Adam Smith's butcher, indirectly produce social goods as a byproduct of self-interested
motives. 16
Legal theorists have criticized this account on many fronts.
For one thing the baseline from which balance of powers is to be
measured is conceptually ambiguous and empirically unclear.17
For another the connection between officials' individual interests
and institutional interests is weak, especially in Congress; the
dominant motivation for legislators is partisanship, not institutional ambition, so that Madisonian competition among institutions is replaced by partisan competition. (We examine this view
in Part I.B, and will also examine a variant view, asymmetric
Madisonianism, which posits that the presidential bureaucracy
does systematically protect and promote the long-run interests
of the presidency as an institution, while on the legislative side
there is much weaker incentive to defend congressional prerogatives.) Furthermore, Madison's account is an ersatz invisiblehand system, which lacks the key causal mechanism that might
in principle (if not in practice) make Smithian market competition socially beneficial. By contrast with competition in ideal
markets, Madisonian competition lacks a price mechanism that
aligns the outcomes of the invisible-hand system with social
welfare.18

For now, we set aside these critiques to focus on the way in
which legal scholars have attempted to carry forward the Madisonian vision. The main argument of interest here is an argument for what we will call "Madisonian" judging, in which judges act as impartial regulators or referees of the competitive
system, attempting to promote an ongoing system of checks and
balances over time. The quotation marks indicate that, in our
view, the argument is fallacious, a kind of category mistake.
Judging of that sort may or may not be defensible on other
grounds, but cannot be justified on the basis of Madison's invisible-hand theory of checks and balances. Any attempt to do so
will end up committing the inside/outside fallacy.
"Madisonian" judging supposes that the proper role of
courts, in controversies involving the separation of powers and
16

See Smith, Wealth of Nations at 14 (cited in note 13).
See M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers
Law, 150 U Pa L Rev 603, 604-05 (2001); Posner, Balance-of-Power Arguments at *2
(cited in note 12).
18 See Vermeule, The System of the Constitution at 42 (cited in note 12).
17
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the structure of government, is to prevent "encroachment" or
"aggrandizement" in which one branch absorbs all or part of the
power of another.19 (In Madison's original and narrow formulation, tyranny would arise only when one branch absorbed the
whole power of another, but the post-Madisonian theory usually
ignores this restriction and treats partial encroachment identically to wholesale conquest; we will follow suit.) In this vision,
relentless competition between the "political branches"-an odd
locution that legal theorists use to denote the nonjudicial
branches-needs an impartial referee, one who occupies the
same position in relation to the lawmaking system as an impartial antitrust regulator occupies in relation to the system of
market competition. The judicial branch is that referee.
Whatever may or may not be said on behalf of such a vision,
it is emphatically not derivable from Madison's invisible-hand
argument. Nothing in that argument posits the existence of a
branch of government that functions as an external regulator of
the competitive system. On the contrary, the frame of Madison's
argument supposes that "exterior provisions"20 for protecting liberty amount to little more than "parchment barriers,"21 Compliance with which will fail the test of incentive compatibility: no
institution will have both the capacity and incentive to enforce
such a set of arrangements. The challenge for the constitutional
designer is precisely to set up naturally self-regulating institutional mechanisms, resting on the powerful motives of ambition
and self-interest rather than the feeble motive of promoting the
common good.
Put differently, arguments for "Madisonian" judging go
wrong by assuming that judges stand outside the Madisonian
system. That amounts to a confusion of perspectives. Madison
writes as a constitutional designer trying to persuade constitutional ratifiers. Both Madison and his audience stood outside the
system of institutional competition that would, upon ratification,
19 For discussions of aggrandizement in constitutional doctrine and theory, see, for
example, Bowsher v Synar, 478 US 714, 727 (1986); INS v Chadha, 462 US 919, 951
(1983); Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 122-23 (1976); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances
in an Era of PresidentialLawmaking, 61 U Chi L Rev 123, 125-26 (1994); A. Michael
Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, 88 Nw U L Rev 1346, 1367-69
(1994); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in ConstitutionalLaw, 118 Harv
L Rev 915, 950-60 (2005); Thomas P. Crocker, PresidentialPower and Constitutional
Responsibility, 52 BC L Rev 1551, 1557 (2011).
20 Federalist 51 (Madison) at 347 (cited in note 10).
21
Federalist 48 (Madison), in The Federalist332, 333 (cited in note 10).
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be established by the new Constitution. But there is not a word
in Federalist 51 suggesting that the judicial branch, an institution within the new constitutional order, will somehow stand
outside the system of mutual checking through institutional
ambition. Indeed, throughout The Federalist Madison lists the
"judiciary department" as on the same footing as the legislative
and executive departments; each must be given the capacity and
incentive for self-defense, and the motive power of institutional
self-defense must be supplied by tying individual to institutional
ambition. Madison does think that the greatest risk of aggrandizement comes from the legislative "vortex,"22 but this does not
imply that judges are outside the competitive system he would
erect; it merely implies that both the executive and the judges
must be given especially powerful means of self-defense. Madison says exactly that as to the executive,23 and the logic extends
to the judicial branch as well. The Framers, socialized in the
traditions of English law in which all judges were at least in
theory the Crown's judges,24 had only a hazy conception of the
distinction between executive and judicial power; there is no

reason to think that Publius expected the judiciary branch to behave differently, from the standpoint of institutional self-defense,
than the executive branch.

The true Madisonian perspective, then, is the external
standpoint of a designer of the constitutional system, who must
also perforce be an analyst of politics. From that standpoint, the
judiciary is just another of the branches struggling to encroach
upon the others or to aggrandize itself at the expense of the others; judges are just part of the invisible-hand system, not some
sort of external regulator of the system. Indeed, the paradoxical
logic of the true Madisonian perspective is that the invisible-hand
system may work well only if judges, presidents, or legislators
do not consider the overall welfare of the system, but instead attempt to aggrandize the power of their respective branches. Imagine, for example, that public-spirited officials in the legislative
and judicial branches incorporate the legitimate institutional interests of the executive into their own decisions, while the executive single-mindedly aggrandizes its own power, heedless of the
legitimate institutional interests of the other branches.25 The
22
23
24
25

Id.
See Federalist 51 (Madison) at 350 (cited in note 10).
See Federalist 47 (Madison), in The Federalist323, 325 (cited in note 10).
See Vermeule, The System of the Constitution at 39-40 (cited in note 12).
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asymmetric distribution of public-spirited motivations across
branches might lead to a kind of double counting of executive interests, creating a long-run tendency to remorseless expansion of
executive power. That expansion might or might not be a good
thing, all things considered, but from a Madisonian perspective
it represents a destabilizing force within the system of checks
and balances, which if taken to an extreme would defeat the
original aim of preventing aggrandizement. The best chance to
prevent aggrandizement might be for the judges and legislators
to ignore even the legitimate interests of the executive, robustly
contesting assertions of executive power.
More abstractly, if universal cooperation to promote overall
welfare is unattainable, a competitive system might function
best overall if none of the actors attempts to consider the overall
well-being of the system, and instead all concerned pursue their
private interests. This is a problem of partial compliance or second best, one that arises in many domains. Analogously, economists and political theorists have argued that even if an economy in which all agents are fully altruistic would be best of all,
an economy in which all agents are entirely self-interested
might do better for all than an economy in which agents are
somewhat altruistic (or only some agents are altruistic).26 Likewise, in an adversarial system of litigation, judges might obtain
the most useful information from litigants if each party advocates relentlessly for its own interests, rather than attempting
to consider the other party's interests from an impartial perspective.27 These are just possibilities, as is our parallel point about a
Madisonian system. But it is a serious complication for "Madi-

sonian" judging that judicial attempts to stand outside the system, as an impartial referee or antitrust regulator, might make
things worse, not better, from the very standpoint of preventing
aggrandizement.
B. Partisan Competition
An alternative to the Madisonian system of institutional
competition is a system of partisan competition. In the political
26

See Serge-Christophe Kolm, Introduction to the Economics of Giving, Altruism,

and Reciprocity, in Serge-Christophe Kolm and Jean Mercier Ythier, eds, 1 Handbook on
the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity 1, 93-94 (Elsevier 2006); Jon Elster,
Altruistic Behavior and Altruistic Motivations, in Kolm and Ythier, eds, 1 Handbook on
the Economics of Giving 183, 202-05 (cited in note 26).
27 See Vermeule, The System of the Constitution at 91-93 (cited in note 12).
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economy literature that models interactions-checks and balances-among institutions in a system of separated powers, a
common modeling constraint is some rule that prevents Coasean
bargains among actors to carve up or reallocate powers on mutually beneficial lines.28 Such a constraint is a necessary prerequisite to a functioning system of mutual checks among separated
institutions; if actors may costlessly bargain to reallocate powers
among themselves, then the Constitution's specification of powers and functions will be circumvented. Low transaction costs
defeat the separation of powers across institutions.29
Political parties illustrate the Coasean vulnerability of the
Madisonian system. Parties, on this perspective, are coalitions of
actors who implicitly bargain to reallocate powers among themselves, regardless of the long-run power or interest of the institutions they happen to temporarily control. If, for example, Congress and the presidency are both controlled by the same party,
there is no reason to expect vigorous institutional competition
between the branches. The individual interests of legislators will
be tied to the interests of their partisan coalition, not to those of
Congress as an institution; the "interests of the man" will come
untethered from "the [ ] rights of the place."3o There is no reason
to think that partisan interests will or will not systematically or
routinely correlate with long-run institutional interests, although they may do so fortuitously and in the short run.
In the legal literature, Professors Daryl J. Levinson and
Richard H. Pildes have offered an important and clarifying argument that the US system is one of "Separation of Parties, Not
Powers."31 To be sure, our system displays both separation of
parties and separation of powers. 32 In the configuration of divided government, in which Congress and the presidency are controlled by different parties, partisan interests happen to align
with institutional divergence, producing institutional conflict
and competition that may if anything be all too vigorous. But
28 Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, Democratic Devices and Desires 252-54
(Cambridge 2001); Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, The Economic Effects of Constitutions 94-96 (MIT 2003).
29 See Donald Wittman, The Constitution as an Optimal Social Contract:A Transaction Cost Analysis of The Federalist Papers, in Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman, eds, The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism73, 73-84 (Agathon 1989).
3o Federalist 51 (Madison) at 349 (cited in note 10).
31 Levinson and Pildes, 119 Harv L Rev at 2312 (cited in note 11).
32 Richard A. Epstein, Why Parties and Powers Both Matter: A Separationist Response to Levinson and Pildes, 119 Harv L Rev F 210, 213 (2006) (responding to Levinson and Pildes, who are cited in note 11).
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even then the institutional competition is in part a byproduct of
partisan competition, so Professors Levinson and Pildes are
surely correct that the Madisonian vision of institutional competition is a distinctly poor guide to observed political behavior, in
large part because parties reallocate powers along lines that are
orthogonal to institutions. Accordingly, Professors Levinson and
Pildes worry most about periods of unified government; their
concern is that parties will transform the Madisonian system into a system of excessively concentrated powers, through delegation and other mechanisms.33
This diagnosis rests on an external account of the system of
partisan competition, one that draws upon political science and
economics to explain the motivations of actors in the constitutional order. When the discussion turns to prescriptions, however, things change. Professors Levinson and Pildes offer a number of proposals for ameliorating the harms of unified
government. Among these are prescriptions offered to (1) the judiciary, (2) "democratic institutional design[ers]," and (3) the political parties themselves.34 All three sets of prescriptions assume the internal perspective of their respective addressees, and
all three suffer from versions of the determinacy paradox. If the
diagnosis of partisan competition is correct, there may be no institution with both the capacity and incentive to supply solutions. Professors Levinson and Pildes, that is, offer supply-side
prescriptions that may fail the test of incentive compatibility,
given their own account of political motivations. This is not to
say that their prescriptions necessarily fail incentive compatibility. Perhaps some further conditions might be specified that
would make the supply side of the story hang together with the
demand side. But the prescriptions cannot simply be assumed or
stipulated to succeed based on a theory of motivations inconsistent with the theory that underpins the diagnosis.
The prescriptions offered to the judiciary include, inter alia,
suggestions for ways in which judges might massage the constitutional law of separation of powers, and the closely related interpretive default rules concerning statutory authorization of
presidential action, in order to ameliorate or check the potential
harms arising from unified partisan government.35 But this
amounts to a sudden switch to an internal perspective that assumes
33 See Levinson and Pildes, 119 Harv L Rev at 2347 (cited in note 11).
Id at 2368-84.
35 Id at 2349-56.
34
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public-spirited judging; it implicitly treats the judiciary as outside the partisan system that the diagnosis describes as ubiquitous. Why should the judges be any different? Unified government, at least if protracted for a sufficient period, would mean
that judges associated with one party control the judiciary, and
in effect reallocate powers to a branch controlled by the same
party, through their constitutional rulings.
It is no answer to observe that Article III judges enjoy life
tenure and are thus putatively insulated from politics. That insulation liberates the judges to indulge their preferences, subject
to the constraints of the reactions of other institutions. But the
preferences that are indulged may themselves be partisan ones.
Because parties control the selection mechanism, judges will be
selected on a more or less partisan basis, subject to the constraints of what the other party will agree to.36 Even the latter
constraint will give way in periods of unified government, when
both president and Senate are dominated by the same party.
The literature in political science on the determinants of judicial
voting finds a strong partisan influence. Although law also matters, and although partisanship matters most in certain classes
of cases and at the Supreme Court, still and all, the single best
predictor of judicial votes in cases where there is disagreement
is generally the political party of the appointing president.37
Moreover, studies that have attempted to determine the causal
mechanisms that bring judicial rulings into alignment with majoritarian preferences have found that the main channel is selection-selection of judges with the right ideological proclivities.38
Those judges need not, of course, subjectively experience themselves as casting votes along partisan lines; the mechanism operates behind the judges' backs, through bias rather than ill
intentions.
Judges are inside the political system, not outside it. If the
system is structured and pervaded by partisan competition, as
Professors Levinson and Pildes argue,39 then one cannot turn
36 See Cass R. Sunstein, et al, Are Judges Political? An Empirical Analysis of the
FederalJudiciary 113-22 (Brookings 2006).
37

See id at 129-31.

38 See, for example, Gregory C. Sisk and Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates about Statistical Measures, 99 Nw U L Rev 743, 778 (2005);
Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanshipand Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Yale L J 2155, 2169-71
(1998).

39 See Levinson and Pildes, 119 Harv L Rev at 2329 (cited in note 11).
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around and assume that the judges will be immune. If and to
the extent that judges are partisan, so that judicial votes are determined by partisan advantage (whatever the subjective experience of judging), it is pointless to give the judges publicspirited advice. Unless that advice happens fortuitously to coincide with partisan interests, it will fall on deaf ears. Professors
Levinson and Pildes clearly identify the anomaly, observing
that:
[T]he judicial branch itself is hardly quarantined, at least in
the long run, from the effects of party politics. The hope that
courts will use constitutional rules to check unified party
government must be tempered by the recognition that the
same unified government will be appointing judges and exercising some measure of ongoing political control over the
courts. 40
Similar points hold for Professors Levinson and Pildes's
other supply-side prescriptions, addressed to "democratic institutional design[ers]" and to the parties themselves. As to the
former, Professors Levinson and Pildes are vague about. who
these designers are supposed to be; most frequently, they use
the passive voice and other constructs that leave it unclear
which actor is meant to supply the institutional prescriptions
they recommend.41 The reason for doing so is clear. Most of the
institutional prescriptions that Professors Levinson and Pildes
offer are subconstitutional-involving legislative rules to protect
legislative minorities and administrative structures to insulate
agencies from partisan oversight.42 But this runs squarely into
the determinacy paradox. Such rules will have to be supplied by
Congress, but according to the terms of Professors Levinson and
Pildes's diagnosis, legislators act principally on partisan motivations, and it is unclear why they will have any incentive to supply
institutions intended to ameliorate partisanship or the effect of
unified government. 43 To enact the relevant rules and institutions
Id at 2355.
See, for example, id at 2374.
See id at 2375-84.
43 For another, and quite typical, example of this problem, see Gregory Dolin,
Speaking of Science: Introducing Notice-and-Comment into the Legislative Process, 2014
Utah L Rev *1-2 (forthcoming), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2211769 (visited Nov
24, 2013). The diagnosis is that Congress bungles science-related issues, in large part
due to the "lack of an independent, non-partisan forum for discussing and evaluating
proposals." Id at *26. Committee hearings end up being partisan charades rather than
occasions for genuine deliberation. See id at *6-15. The cure is supposed to be a
40

41
42
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would require, in many cases, the approval of both houses of
Congress plus the president; they are thus most easily enacted
during periods of unified government, precisely the periods in
which the dominant party will have the least interest in enacting them.
A fortiori, the same holds for prescriptions addressed directly to the parties. When Professors Levinson and Pildes say
things like, "we might use legal rules and institutions to prevent
strong parties from unifying government so thoroughly as to
threaten Madisonian values,"4 one wants to ask who this "we" is
supposed to be. We act principally through parties, or so Professors Levinson and Pildes have argued, and the question is why
parties would have any incentive to listen to such advice or to
adopt it. The point is not that such arrangements could never
come about. In certain political configurations, certain mechanisms might explain why parties cede rights to legislative minorities, create agencies insulated from their own control, or
otherwise act against their seeming short-run interests. Work in
political science explores such mechanisms.45 But as is common
in the legal literature, Professors Levinson and Pildes do not
discuss such supply-side mechanisms in any detail, and their existence cannot by any means simply be assumed.
We have lingered on Professors Levinson and Pildes because
of the importance of their work on partisan competition and the
constitutional order, but similar inside/outside problems crop up
elsewhere. Another example is a recent and important paper
by Professors Curtis A. Bradley and Trevor W. Morrison on

"non-partisan body of experts," akin to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), that
would "score" proposals for scientific validity. See id at *26. Given the diagnosis of hopeless partisanship, the argument needs an account of the supply side-of why exactly partisan members of Congress would bring such a nonpartisan scientific body into existence
and then respect its neutrality over time. The only account offered here-offered as an
explanation for the creation of a nonpartisan CBO, but presumably intended to apply by
analogy-is the idea that "Congress is by its very nature bipartisan (even when a single
party has a majority in both chambers) and therefore each party has to try to accommodate the other to a certain extent." See id at *41. This is in obvious tension with the diagnosis; if that's so, then why doesn't the ordinary committee process provide a sufficiently bipartisan forum, making a special body unnecessary?
44 Levinson and Pildes, 119 Harv L Rev at 2379 (cited in note 11).
45 See, for example, David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design
32-36 (Stanford 2003); Arjen Boin, Sanneke Kuipers, and Marco Steenbergen, The Life

and Death of Public Organizations:A Question of InstitutionalDesign?, 23 Governance
385, 402 (2010).
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acquiescence and historical gloss in separation of powers law.46
The traditional notion, captured by Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer,47 is that a
long-continued pattern of executive behavior known to and acquiesced in by Congress can create a "gloss" on presidential
power that becomes part of the operating constitution.
Professors Bradley and Morrison draw upon the political
science literature and related legal work to launch a devastating
critique of that idea. Congress faces severe problems of collective
action; even if all legislators would benefit from defending the
long-run interests and prerogatives of Congress as an institution, individual legislators' incentives are political and partisan,
above all to seek reelection. Given the public-good character of
legislative self-defense, that good will be undersupplied and
Congress as an institution will often fail to protect itself from
presidential aggrandizement.48 The institutional presidency, by
contrast, suffers fewer problems of collective action because it
has a relatively unified and hierarchical structure and because
there is a standing executive bureaucracy, in the Department of
Justice's Office of Legal Counsel and elsewhere, devoted to protecting presidential prerogatives. Although Professors Bradley
and Morrison do not use the term, their picture is in effect one of
asymmetric Madisonianism in which the presidency as an institution does a much better job of protecting its interest than does
Congress. It follows from this analysis that the acquiescence
doctrine is suspect, because Congress will sometimes or often
fail to take action to protect itself even when it should (from a
Madisonian point of view). Congressional silence is a poor proxy
for substantive agreement or a tacit interbranch bargain; rather
it may indicate only inertia and failures of collective action
among legislators.
So far the analysis is highly persuasive. But when Professors Bradley and Morrison turn to the prescriptive questions,
they never ask whether the system of asymmetric Madisonianism that they discuss at the stage of diagnosis might affect the
behavior of judges as well; rather the judges are assumed to be
outside the system. In their words,

46 Curtis A. Bradley and Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation
of Powers, 126 Harv L Rev 411, 432 (2012).
47 343 US 579 (1952).
48 See Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 440-41 (cited in note 46).
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the same shortcomings with the Madisonian model that undercut claims of congressional acquiescence in general also
carry specific implications for the role of the courts in this
area. . . . The implication here is that courts should be more

circumspect about invoking congressional acquiescence as a
basis for deferring to executive practice. By itself, this point
does not defeat all arguments for judicial deference in matters relating to executive power. It does suggest, however,
that such arguments should be closely scrutinized, to ensure
that they are not based on the kinds of Madisonian assumptions about congressional capacity and motivation that we
have shown to be problematic here.49
But the judges to whom the prescription is addressed may have
no incentive to heed it, for the very reasons given in the diagnosis. The core issue Professors Bradley and Morrison identify is
that presidents do a better job of attending to the long-run institutional interests of the presidency than partisan legislators do
of attending to the long-run institutional interests of the Congress.50 Which motivation-institutional aggrandizement or partisan advantage-dominates judicial behavior? Either answer
would compromise Professors Bradley and Morrison's prescriptions. If judges are good Madisonian actors who attempt to aggrandize the judiciary-if the "interest of the [judge]" is tied to
the "rights of the [institutional judiciary]," to adapt Madison's
phrase-then judges will follow Professors Bradley and Morrison's suggestions only insofar as doing so promotes the judiciary's interests.51 Those interests, however, run orthogonally to
the beneficial functioning of the Madisonian system, viewed
from the external standpoint of the system designer or theoretical analyst.
Id at 452.
Id at 441-43.
51 As Professor Alison L. LaCroix points out:
[Tihe Madisonian model haunts Bradley and Morrison's account. Much of their
argument presumes an adversarial relationship between the political branches
and largely overlooks the role of judiciary. Their Article for the most part
treats the judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, as an arbiter of separation
of powers disputes rather than as an active branch of the federal government.
But, as the examples of judicial review and the political question doctrine
demonstrate, the Court's decisions on issues of justiciability are assertions of
ultimate interpretive authority, however deferential and self-restraining their
immediate impact.
Alison L. LaCroix, HistoricalGloss: A Primer,126 Harv L Rev F 75, 83 (2012).
49
50
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Conversely, suppose that the judiciary is not a good Madisonian actor. Suppose, given that there are hundreds of Article
III judges arranged in a somewhat loosely centralized hierarchy,
that the judiciary suffers from problems of collective action similar to those that afflict Congress. Judges' individual incentives
need not align, and may or may not systematically align, with
the aim of Professors Bradley and Morrison's advice, which is to
promote the healthy overall functioning of the Madisonian system. Here too it is critical that the judges who are supposed to
supply remedies are themselves selected by the very actors
whose pathologies (from the Madisonian standpoint) are at issue. One of the main channels of long-run presidential influence
is the selection of judges.52 If Congress-particularly the Senate-is unable to organize consistently to defend congressional
prerogatives during the process of appointment and confirmation, the consequence may be a systematic tendency, over time,
for the judiciary to be composed of judges who happen to believe,
quite sincerely, that the Constitution correctly read imposes
substantial constraints on Congress, favors expansive executive
power, or both. Such judges will, for the very reasons identified
in Professors Bradley and Morrison's diagnosis, be resistant to
their prescriptions.
This is just one empirical possibility among many. It is also
logically possible that in any given case, judges' incentives or biases will happen to align with the goals of a well-motivated designer of a sustainable system of Madisonian competition. But
any such alignment may be fortuitous and temporary. Nor is the
possibility limited to judges; the president's self-regarding incentives might, in particular circumstances, lead him to protect
congressional prerogatives, say from judicial attack. The contingencies are unlimited and complex, and it is possible to specify
just the right combination of assumptions to get almost any story off the ground, at least for a short flight. But there is no general and systematic reason to think either that there will be, or
will not be, judicial demand for the sort of counsel that Professors Bradley and Morrison offer. Substantively, the issues are
empirical and contingent, and we are (for present purposes) entirely agnostic about the merits. Methodologically, however, the
crucial issue we mean to raise is one of consistency: judges too

52 See Jack M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 Va L Rev 1045, 1067 (2001).
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are inside the system, and advice from the external standpoint
will have to be refracted through the motivations of actors within the system. The analyst's first duty is to ensure that the combination of assumptions she adopts is consistent, across both
prescription and diagnosis.
Process Theory: Majority Prejudice, Official Self-Dealing,
Interest Groups

C.

We have focused on Madisonianism and its variants, but
structurally similar points apply to other theoretical frameworks
in public law; we will treat these more briefly. Our catch-all label is "process theory," stemming from sources such as John
Hart Ely's theory of judicial review and literatures in public
choice and political economy.53 Process theories come in many
shadings, but we will mention three main concerns: (1) majority
prejudice that prevents the impartial representation of minorities; (2) self-dealing by incumbent officials who choke off "the
channels of political change,"54 through institutional arrangements that in effect gerrymander the political system to perpetuate themselves; and (3) vote buying and campaign financing by
interest groups who cause legislators to act in ways that benefit
the groups but reduce overall welfare.
In all three contexts, theorists have proposed judicial review
as a potential corrective. Ely justified a great deal of the Warren
Court's work as an effort to promote representation of the interests of minorities in a pervasively prejudiced system of politics,
or alternatively to prevent incumbent officials from insulating
themselves against political challenge5 A generation after Ely,
public choice theorists argued that the role of interest groups in
politics implied a need for expansive judicial review; facing no
need for reelection, life-tenured federal judg6s would be less beholden to such groups and could deploy constitutional protections to block inefficient ("rent-seeking") legislation.56

53 See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust:A Theory of JudicialReview 101-04
(Harvard 1980).
54

Id at 103.

Id at 74-75.
See, for example, Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and
the Rules of Procedure,23 J Legal Stud 627, 631 (1994); Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction
Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 Va L Rev 471, 510 (1988).
5s
56
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Here too, however, the theorists tended to offer skeptical accounts of the motivations and behavior of political actors at the
stage of diagnosis, while quietly dropping those accounts at the
stage of prescription. The same motivations that cause legislators, interest groups, and others to behave in self-interested or
prejudiced ways will cause those actors to constrain or negate
judicial efforts to correct process deficiencies. The theorists overlooked, in other words, that judges do not stand outside the system; judicial behavior is an endogenous product of the system.
As to interest group theory, for example, Professor Einer R.
Elhauge in effect identified the determinacy-paradox problemalthough not in those terms-when he argued that
[t]hose advocating more intrusive judicial review rarely address this comparative question. Instead the tendency is to
emphasize the flaws of the political process and then assume without analysis that the litigation process will operate better. The litigation process plays the role of a deus ex
machina that can correct the flaws that grip the other lawmaking branches but is apparently without flaw itself.
But the litigation process cannot be treated as exogenous to interest group theory: it too is susceptible to interest
group influences.67
If particular groups remain latent-that is, unorganizedbecause they face severe problems of collective action, then they
will be unorganized for purposes of litigation just as much as for
purposes of electioneering, campaign finance, and lobbying.
Thus organized groups will have systematic advantages in setting judicial agendas through case selection, in the quality of
advocacy they offer, and so forth. The simple accounts of collective action that underpin most interest-group theory are insufficiently fine-grained to discriminate between action in legislative
and judicial arenas.
This is not to say that more fine-grained theories cannot be
offered. Professor Thomas W. Merrill, for example, replies that
interest group theory rightly understood does justify more intrusive judicial review, because (1) fewer resources are needed to
enter the litigation arena than the legislative arena; and (2)
once litigation has begun, the marginal effect of further expenditures falls more quickly towards zero in litigation than in
57 Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 Yale L J 31, 67 (1991) (citation omitted).
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lobbying.58 If Professor Merrill is correct, then Professor Elhauge
overstates things when he makes the substantive claim that
"the same interest groups that have an organizational advantage in collecting resources to influence. legislators and agencies generally also have an organizational advantage in collecting resources to influence the courts."59 But whichever view is
correct on the merits, Professor Elhauge's crucial methodological
point remains unimpeached: judicial behavior cannot be treated
as exogenous or a deus ex machina-a miraculous intervention
from outside the system. The analyst must follow through to determine whether the same theories of motivation, cognition, and
behavior offered to diagnose a problem also vitiate the remedy,
including the preferred remedy of so many constitutional theorists, expanded judicial power.
The same holds with appropriate modifications for Ely's
theory of judicial review. Suppose that a large, stable, and prejudiced majority controls both the executive and legislative
branches by virtue of its domination over elections. Because the
executive and legislative jointly control the process of judicial
appointments, that same majority may, either with invidious intent or in a heedless way, filter out judges who would challenge
majority prejudices and filter in judges who share them. Or it
may not do so, under certain conditions; the possibilities are legion and the questions are ultimately empirical. But as a matter
of methodological consistency, it is incumbent on the Elyian theorist to explain why such a result will not hold, given the theorist's assumptions about other actors.60
Likewise, if incumbents are choking off the channels of political change, one of their principal concerns might well be to
choke off the litigation channel that might be used to challenge
their entrenched power. Through appointment of members of
the entrenched coalition to the bench, implicit threats of retaliation, or simple refusal to enforce judicial decisions against themselves, the incumbents would attempt to structure judicial behavior so as to perpetuate their own power. They may or may
not succeed in doing so, but the analyst must confront the issue
58 Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify Judicial Activism After
All?, 21 Harv J L & Pub Pol 219, 224-25 (1997).
59 Elhauge, 101 Yale L J at 67-68 (cited in note 57). See also Derrick A. Bell Jr,
Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-ConvergenceDilemma, 93 Harv L Rev 518,
525-26 (1980).
60 For an example in this spirit, see Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged
by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 Stan L Rev 155, 204-05 (2007).
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and attempt to identify the conditions under which the attempt
will or will not occur and will or will not prevail. As a matter of
consistency, judicial behavior cannot be assumed to float outside
the political system, and the theories deployed to identify problems cannot be quietly discarded when the time comes to propose solutions.
A final example, closely related to process theory and problems of majority prejudice, involves a reaction to Professor Derrick Bell's "interest-convergence" thesis, which holds (roughly)
that "blacks receive favorable judicial decisions to the extent
that their interests coincide with the interests of whites."61 On
this view, an overwhelmingly white judiciary maximizes the
promotion of "white interests."62 If So, then it follows that normative advice to judges must take this constraint into account or
else prove irrelevant; arguments for favorable judicial decisions
for blacks must be cast in terms of the interests of whites.
The interest-convergence thesis has been criticized for denying the moral agency of white judges who attempted to undermine segregation out of moral conviction, rather than racially
defined group interest; this denial is said to encourage fatalism
and passivity about racial progress through constitutional law.63
But the criticism fails if, in fact, the interest-convergence thesis
is true; then the relevant complaint would be not that the white
judges lack agency, but that they exercise their agency in morally objectionable ways. A valid criticism would arise only if some
analyst both subscribed to the interest-convergence thesis and
also offered the white judiciary normative advice to the effect
that the judges should protect the constitutional rights of blacks
regardless of white interests. Bell himself, however, appears to
have been consistent on this score. 64
II. PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND EMERGENCIES

Inside/outside fallacies are frequently on display in debates
over presidential power and emergency powers. These debates
are related to the broader debates over separation of powers and
checks and balances, and thus partake of the problems discussed
in Part I, but there are additional reasons why the inside/outside
61
Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-ConvergenceThesis, 105 Nw U L Rev 149,
151 (2011). See also Bell, 93 Harv L Rev at 523 (cited in note 59).
62 Driver, 105 Nw U L Rev at 179 (cited in note 61).
63 Id at 175-81.
64 Bell, 93 Harv L Rev at 523 (cited in note 59).
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problem becomes especially acute in this domain. Presidential
power and emergency powers pose acute dilemmas for analysts
and actors who want government to have power to respond vigorously to emergencies, but who also fear that an imperial presidency will ride roughshod over legality and liberal rights. A
common reaction is to attempt to escape the dilemma by licensing presidential action that-the hope runs-will somehow remain outside the system, setting no precedent for the future and
maintaining the purity of the law and legal rights. We will trace
that idea through three different arguments, and show that it
rests on a conceptual confusion. Presidential action is always
and necessarily action within the system; there is no way to prevent such action from setting precedents. So too with judicial responses to presidential action; whatever judges do will create a
precedent, either de jure or de facto, within the system.
A.

Responsible Illegality

We will begin with a view of emergency powers that is widespread among liberal commentators (liberal in the politicaltheory sense). This view comes in a number of shadings and variants, but the common theme is an attempt to wall off emergency action from the ordinary legal system and constitutional order. The fear is that the need to allow government to act
vigorously in emergencies will cause judges or other actors to
distort the normal rules in ways that will license ongoing abuses
when the emergency has passed.
Thus the commentators want government actors, especially
the executive, to adopt a posture of "responsible illegality." The
president, for example, if faced with the need to take decisive action in emergencies that violates ordinary liberal rights, should
do what needs doing, candidly admit the illegality, and throw
himself on the judgment of the public. The public in turn may
ratify his actions through legislation, retroactively immunize
him from liability, pardon his excesses, or otherwise excuse him
from the ordinary legal consequences of wrongdoing. Although
this sort of regime has been justified in part on grounds of accountability, the main impetus is to immunize ordinary law
from the distorting effects of emergencies. Above all, liberal
commentators want to prevent the creation of a new equilibrium
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in which extraordinary powers wielded in one emergency have
become routinized in the legal system. 65
The mistake is to think that presidential emergency action
can be somehow placed outside the ordinary system-outside
the constitutional order of which it is a part. On the contrary,
even if judges or legislators refuse to give presidential action de
jure recognition under the Constitution, the cycle of illegalityand-ratification may itself become routinized as a part of the
constitutional order, resulting in the same substantive expansion of executive power in a small-c constitutional sense. In Albert Venn Dicey's account of martial law and emergency powers,
ex post ratification or indemnification by Parliament of necessary but illegal ministerial action is seen as a convention-an
unwritten political norm that, although not enforceable in the
courts of law, is nonetheless obligatory on the relevant actors. 66
So too in the American case. The liberal commentators forget
that the constitutional order comprises not only laws, but also
conventions that determine which laws must be respected and
which may be broken, with what consequences. Such conventions result, in part, from precedent-setting behavior by political
actors; an episode of illegality-plus-ratification will itself set a
precedent. The overlay of illegality-licensing conventions is just
as much part of the system as the first-order laws themselves.
The liberal hope to set up a wall of separation between emergencies and the constitutional system is thus doomed to fail.
Although the connection is not immediately obvious, the inside/outside fallacy lurking within the argument for responsible
illegality is another example of the determinacy paradox, just as
in the cases discussed in Part I. The diagnosis that underpins
the argument from responsible illegality is that presidents, legislators, judges, and other actors have a set of motivations and
beliefs that threaten to produce a cycle of ever-expanding executive power-a one-way ratchet.67 Although proponents of the
theory do not usually offer clear and precise mechanisms to explain this cycle, the implicit picture is a reprise of asymmetric
65 See, for example, Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 Yale L J 1011, 1023 (2003) (arguing for an "ExtraLegal Measures model" of emergency powers in which public officials may "act extralegally," subject to ex post review); Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception 2 (Chicago 2005).
66 AN. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 280, 407
(Macmillan 8th ed 1915).
67 See Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts 133-50 (Oxford 2007) (discussing and criticizing ratchet theory).
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Madisonianism, powered by emergencies: presidents seek to
maximize their power and that of their office, while legislators
and judges are myopic, granting presidents expansive emergency powers today without sufficiently taking into account the future consequences of the precedent that they set. But the prescription, the regime of responsible illegality, does nothing to
remove these underlying motivations and cognitive shortcomings. If presidents are power-maximizers, then they will not admit that they acted illegally and ask the public for forgiveness;
and if they are public-spirited, then there is no reason to constrain them with the law.68
B.

Robert Jackson on Emergencies and Precedent

The fantasy that emergency action can be quarantined
through a principle of responsible illegality bewitches external
analysts of presidential and emergency powers, but a similar
mistake afflicts actors within the system as well. A classic example is Justice Robert Jackson's dissent in Korematsu v United
States,69 the notorious decision that licensed internment of Jap-

anese aliens and Japanese-American citizens in a military zone
along the West Coast during World War II. Justice Jackson's
opinion attempts to square the circle of emergency powers by
stepping outside the system from within the system-a conceptual impossibility.
In Justice Jackson's view, the justices were helpless to resist
the military's internment order, nor should they wish to resist it.
As to the feasibility of resistance, the nature of military problems entails that "courts can never have any real alternative to
accepting the mere declaration of the authority that issued the
order that it was reasonably necessary from a military viewpoint."70 As to the desirability of resistance, "[w]hen an area is so
beset that it must be put under military control at all, the paramount consideration is that its measures be successful, rather
68 The paradox can be seen more easily once one realizes that scholars who advocate responsible illegality are essentially arguing that the president should engage in
civil disobedience and the legal system should forgive him when it is justified. If the law
is interpreted as whatever happens in the legal system, the president who is forgiven
never acted illegally in the first place. It's as if Congress passed a law that provided that
anyone who engages in civil disobedience may not be convicted of the crime he is trying
to commit. People then who tried to engage in civil disobedience would not be able to do
so; the underlying substantive law that they object to would simply cease to exist.
6 323 US at 242 (Jackson dissenting).
70 Id at 245 (Jackson dissenting).
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than legal. The armed services must protect a society, not merely its Constitution."71 But it does not follow, for Justice Jackson,
that the courts should themselves review and uphold the military order. To do so would create a damaging precedent, one
that "lies about like a loaded weapon."72 Justice Jackson's
thought is that extralegal military action creates a precedent if,
but only if, it receives a judicial imprimatur: "A military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is
an incident. But if we review and approve, that passing incident
becomes the doctrine of the Constitution."73
Accordingly, Justice Jackson adopted a seemingly paradoxical stance. He voted to discharge the detainee, on the ground
that the courts should not themselves enforce unconstitutional
military orders,74 but he also indicated that the courts should not
have attempted to interfere with the Army in carrying out its
tasks.76 The only way to reconcile these two ideas is that, on Justice Jackson's view, the courts should simply refuse to exercise
jurisdiction if a detainee sues for review of the military's extralegal behavior; Justice Jackson's hope is that the military will do
what it needs to do, entirely outside the legal order, while courts
refuse to intervene.
Justice Jackson's opinion is beloved by lawyers, who hope to
preserve law's purity by extruding military action into some
realm outside the legal system. The hope is doomed to fail, however, because there is a small-c constitution that surrounds and
subsumes the Constitution. The constitution is determined and
structured, in part, by historical episodes that help to create
practices, norms, and obligatory conventions. One of those practices or norms may itself be that courts should step out of the
way when military action is imperative; putative nondecisions of
the sort Justice Jackson suggested in Korematsu would themselves amount to decisions to create a behavioral, practice-based
precedent of that sort, one that future judges or other actors
could cite on appropriate occasions. Judges may refuse to create
a legal precedent in the narrow sense of decisions in the judicial
reports, but they cannot avoid creating an unwritten precedent
through their behavior. There is no way for judges to extrude
71
72
73

74

75

Id at 244 (Jackson dissenting).
Id at 246 (Jackson dissenting).
Korematsu, 323 US at 246 (Jackson dissenting).
Id at 247 (Jackson dissenting).
Id at 248 (Jackson dissenting).
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military action and their refusal to review it from the total system of constitutionalism (as opposed to Constitutional Law).
Any judicial move is a move within the system; there is no escaping the system from within.
In a nonobvious way, Justice Jackson's opinion falls into a
version of the determinacy paradox. The fear of creating a precedent is the fear that future actors will take a precedent that defers to the military and use it in ways Justice Jackson thinks
harmful (the "loaded weapon").76 That amounts to a diagnosis of
the motivations of future actors; Justice Jackson's prescription is
for the Court to decide nothing. Yet the future actors, given the
very motivations posited by the diagnosis, may also claim that
the decision to issue no decision is itself a precedent, one that requires inaction by subsequent courts when asked to overturn
military action. Justice Jackson's view turns out to be pragmatically self-defeating because of an inconsistency between diagnosis and prescription-the hallmark of the determinacy paradox.
At bottom, Justice Jackson's Korematsu opinion is Delphic
and his assumptions unclear. There might well be ways of understanding or specifying those assumptions to make his argument cohere; here are some possibilities. Justice Jackson might
be making one of two assumptions about the motivations of future judges. First, he might assume that judges on future courts,
like his own, will be motivated to avoid confrontation with the
military. But if that is so, the prescription-avoid setting a judicial precedent-will have no effect on them whatsoever. Second,
he might assume that judges on future courts blindly follow judicial precedents, and if that is so, failing to set a judicial precedent may encourage them to rule against the military in appropriate circumstances. But if that is Justice Jackson's reasoning,
he needs to explain why future judges will act differently from
his own court. There is a third possibility, and that is that Justice Jackson hopes that the failure of his Court (and possibly future courts) to endorse a military action will at least force the
military to justify its actions to the public, so that a heightened
level of public attention will substitute for judicial review. Only
this last possibility escapes the inside/outside problem. So we do
not mean to deny that Justice Jackson's opinion might be reconstructed in a coherent fashion, only that there is a prima facie

76

Id at 246 (Jackson dissenting).
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inconsistency in his view and that attention to the inside/outside
problem is a necessary precondition for clarifying his argument.
C.

Emergencies and the Noble Lie: The Beneficial Illusion of
Youngstown

One of Justice Jackson's major contributions to legal theory
was his concurrence in Youngstown, with its famous threecategory classification of presidential action: category one, in
which the action is clearly authorized by statute, so that the
president wields the full combined power of the legislative and
executive branches; category two, in which statutes are silent or
ambiguous, so that presidential action occurs in a "zone of twilight"; and category three, in which the action is clearly prohibited by statute, so that the president can rely only on his own
constitutional powers, and even then only to the extent that they
are exclusive and paramount, so that they trump the statutory
prohibition77
Legal theorists, such as Professor Samuel Issacharoff and
Professor Richard H. Pildes, have elaborated Justice Jackson's
framework into a theory of presidential power during emergencies.78 On this theory, courts engage in constitutional review in
ordinary times, but in perceived emergencies they ask whether
the president is acting with congressional authorization, validating the president's action if but only if that is true. Although judicially developed constitutional rights may have to bend and
give way during emergencies, courts can at least ensure that
presidential action is legitimated and checked by democratic
oversight, through a requirement of legislative approval79
Legal-realist critics,80 however, drawing on work by political

scientists,81 have questioned whether this theory identifies a
cause of judicial behavior or instead merely rationalizes judicial
behavior. The federal statutory landscape is so full of statutes,
and those statutes are so frequently vague or ambiguous-

especially with respect to the unanticipated issues that arise in
77 Youngstown, 343 US at 635-38 (Jackson concurring).
78

See, for example, Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Liber-

tarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights dur-

ing Wartime, 5 Theoretical Inq L 1, 25 (2004).
79 See id at 44.
80 See, for example, Posner and Vermeule, Terror in the Balance at 48-49 (cited in
note 67).
81 See, for example, Terry M. Moe and William G. Howell, The Presidential Power
of Unilateral Action, 15 J L, Econ, & Org 132, 148--53 (1999).
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emergencies-that it is usually possible for judges to argue, with
a straight face, that presidential action in emergencies is authorized by some statute or other. Exhibit A is Dames & Moore v
Regan,82 which drew upon a hodgepodge of inapposite statutes to
find implied authorization for presidential suspension of legal
claims arising from the Iranian hostage crisis and pending in
US courts.83 The overall point is that a judicial determination of
statutory authority is often epiphenomenal, following from rather than determining the judges' decision.
As against this, Professors Issacharoff and Pildes reply that
even though, or even if, the authorization framework is partly
illusory, it is a beneficial illusion, one that underscores values of
democracy, checks and balances, and constitutionalism generally." The response is theoretically interesting because it is not
one that can be offered from within the system. It would be
pragmatically incoherent, even self-defeating, for judges to
adopt the Professors Issacharoff and Pildes approach to presidential emergency powers and to publicly justify it by saying
that the approach, although a rationalization of decisions produced on other grounds, produces beneficial illusions. The very
act of justifying the illusion in this way would dispel it, so long
as those supposed to be subject to the illusion-the audience for
judicial decisions, including informed citizens-are told that an
illusion is what the justification really is. The upshot is that the
beneficial-illusion argument must necessarily remain esoteric; it
represents the sort of noble lie argument that surfaces occasionally in constitutional theory. The noble lie requires that the true
justification for a practice remain concealed from the population
subject to a beneficial illusion, which means that judges cannot
publicly offer that justification within the system. Analysts of
the system of emergency powers may propound it to one another, and judges may secretly harbor the notion within their
hearts, but the beneficial illusion cannot become the stated justification of the governing legal regime within the legal regime.
The determinacy paradox can be avoided here, but only through
subterfuge.86
82 453 US 654 (1981).
83 See id at 676-82.
84 Issacharoff and Pildes, 5 Theoretical Inq L at 36-37 (cited in note 78).
85 There is a similar paradoxical flavor to Professors Dan Kahan and Donald
Braman's argument that because people evaluate evidence through "cognitive filter[s]"
derived from their cultural commitments, it is futile for advocates to try to change their
minds about gun control by supplying them with facts and figures. Instead, advocates
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D. The Supermajoritarian Escalator
Finally, we mention a concrete proposal that illustrates how
the determinacy paradox afflicts proposals for institutional reform of emergency decision making. (Our treatment will be brief
because we have already made the point elsewhere.86) The proposal is Professor Bruce Ackerman's idea of a "supermajoritarian escalator"-a framework statute that aims to limit presidential emergency powers through a procedural device.87 The
statute would give presidents unilateral power to declare an
emergency (producing expanded executive powers), but would
also require legislative authorization after a short period. The
threshold for authorization is initially a simple majority, but
rises in successive periods until it tops out at a stringent 4/5ths
supermajority rule.
The thought behind the proposal is that the framework
statute will constrain presidents from opportunistically seizing
upon emergencies to expand their powers and will prevent panicky legislators from voting blank-check delegations of massive
new powers to presidents in emergencies.8 Yet Ackerman fails
to follow through on that logic, which applies as much to the
prescribed framework statute as to actions that presidents and
legislators would otherwise take absent the statute. If legislators are panicky in the wake of an emergency, they may just as
easily abrogate the framework statute-by a simple majorityas they would otherwise delegate powers to the president, absent the statute. And presidents, who by Professor Ackerman's
hypothesis are opportunistic power-maximizers,89 will have every incentive to portray the framework statute as a dangerous legalism that hamstrings the executive and disables it from taking
necessary action. Professor Ackerman's framework statute is an
attempt at legislative self-binding that fails, because the same

should construct "a pertinent yet respectful expressive idiom" that will persuade (delude?) people into taking the advocates' position. See Dan M. Kahan and Donald
Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion:A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions,
151 U Pa L Rev 1291, 1323-24 (2003). In the spirit of the noble lie, the advocate may
need to conceal his motivation for constructing the idiom in order to make it succeed; it is
not clear whether Kahan and Braman contemplate that.
86 See Vermeule, 75 Fordham L Rev at 637-38 (cited in note 5); Posner and Vermeule, Terror in the Balance at 71-72 (cited in note 67).
87 See Bruce Ackerman, Before the Next Attack: PreservingCivil Liberties in an Age
of Terrorism 81 (Yale 2006).
88 See id.
89 Id at 3.
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motivations and beliefs that make the self-binding desirable (in
Professor Ackerman's view) also make it incentive incompatible.
The self-defeating supermajoritarian escalator illustrates
our broader claim, that the topic of emergency powers is fertile
ground for inside/outside fallacies and the determinacy paradox.
There are two generic reasons why this appears to be so. One is
that legal academics typically combine distrustful pessimism
about the motivations and cognition behind governmental assertions of emergency powers with optimism about the ability of legal rules and institutional structures to channel and constrain
those powers. But this combination constantly threatens to become self-defeating, because the legal rules and institutions at
issue must themselves ultimately be supplied by governmental
officials, who are subject to the same motivational and cognitive
pathologies. The determinacy paradox arises when the assumptions about motivations, beliefs, and constraints that underlie
the diagnosis are inconsistent with those necessary for the prescription to succeed, yet this is the chronic state of legal theorizing about emergency powers.
The second generic reason is that legal theorists hope to
keep the law pure and urge judges and legislators to act accordingly. They hope, in other words, to reconcile raison d'dtat with
legalism by identifying ways in which judges may act to create
separate spheres, so that the legal system remains uncontaminated by governmental action that does what needs to be done
in emergencies; such action, if extruded from the system, will
create no precedents for the future. The hope is conceptually
self-defeating, however, because the very attempt to wall off
emergency action itself creates a precedent for the futurenamely a precedent that the president may do what needs doing,
that legislators will ratify the action ex post, and that the judges
will not interfere. That norm is itself part of the legal system in
a larger sense that includes unwritten constitutionalism, historical episodes and surrounding practices and conventions, even if
the norm is never written down formally in the pages of the reported judicial decisions. Emergency powers become part of the
legal system writ large in spite of, indeed because of, the
measures that theorists urge to wall them off from the system.
III. INTERPRETATION AND ADJUDICATION

We turn now from separation of powers and presidential
power to more general themes, including theories of constitutional
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interpretation, economic theories of litigation, and the role of
precedent in constitutional adjudication. The same paradoxes
arise in these settings, albeit in different form.
A. Originalism and Textualism
Justice Antonin Scalia is well known for his support for
originalism and textualism. Originalism is the doctrine that
courts should enforce the Constitution as it was understood at
the founding, rather than as it has developed over time. Textualism is the doctrine that courts should interpret statutes as written, and not on the basis of legislative history. (We will bracket
the apparent tension between these two positions, which others
have analyzed.)
Justice Scalia argues that one advantage of these doctrines
is that they limit the ability of judges to decide cases in a way
that advances their ideological or partisan preferences. For example, textualism
will narrow the range of acceptable judicial decision-making
and acceptable argumentation. It will curb-even reversethe tendency of judges to imbue authoritative texts with
their own policy preferences.

. .

. Textualism will not relieve

judges of all doubts and misgivings about their interpretations. . . . But textualism will provide greater certainty in

the law, and hence greater predictability and greater respect for the rule of law.9o
He makes a similar argument about originalism9a and also more
generally about the virtues of rules compared to standards.92
90 Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretationof Legal
Texts xxviii-xxix (Thomson/West 2012).

91 See Scalia Defends Originalism as Best Methodology for Judging Law (University of Virginia School of Law Apr 20, 2010), online at https://www.law.virginia.edu/html/
news/2010_spr/scalia.htm (visited Nov 24, 2013):
But originalism does not invite [a judge] to make the law what he thinks it
should be, nor does it permit him to distort history with impunity. . . . All of
this cannot be said of constitutional consequentialists. If ideological judging is
the malady, the avowed application of such personal preferences will surely
hasten the patient's demise, and the use of history is far closer to being the
cure than being the disease.
92 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175,
1179-80 (1989):
For when, in writing for the majority of the Court, I adopt a general rule, and
say, "This is the basis of our decision," I not only constrain lower courts, I constrain myself as well. If the next case should have such different facts that my
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The premise of these arguments is that judges will be inclined to implement their political or policy preferences; if that
were not the case, then the self-constraining advantage of
originalism, textualism, and rule following would be unnecessary. And because the Supreme Court supervises and controls
the lower courts, it is straightforward that the Court can demand that the lower courts adopt methodologies that suppress
their political or policy preferences. What is puzzling, and possibly paradoxical, is that Justice Scalia's argument is reflexive. He
argues that his commitments to originalism, textualism, and
rule following also prevent him from implementing his policy
preferences. He urges other judges to adopt these methodologies
voluntarily so as to curb their own instinct to implement their
ideological preferences.
The paradox can be seen from two directions. First, one can
ask why a justice who seeks to implement his policy preferences
would adopt a method that prevents him from doing so. If the
account of motivation is correct, he would have no reason to
adopt such a method. Second, one can ask why a justice who is
public-spirited enough to adopt a method to prevent himself
from implementing his policy preferences would not be publicspirited enough to decide cases neutrally, case by case. Justice
Scalia risks committing the inside/outside fallacy, as he asserts,
from an external perspective, a theory of judicial motivation that
is inconsistent with the premise of his normative proposals.
There may be a way out of the paradox. Suppose that judges
care about two things: (1) advancing their ideological preferences and (2) maintaining their individual reputation for impartiality. It is possible that if judges too obviously implement their
preferences, they will harm their reputations so greatly that the
reputational costs to the judge will exceed the ideological benefits. Thus, when judges decide cases, they will want to avoid implementing their preferences when doing so is too obvious, and
in these cases decide in a neutral or nonideological fashion.
But then why would they not just do so? The argument depends on an empirical premise as well, namely, that judges suffer from weakness of will and so, when confronted with an ideologically charged case that has a clear answer contrary to a

political or policy preferences regarding the outcome are quite the opposite, I
will be unable to indulge those preferences; I have committed myself to the
governing principle.
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judge's preference, will implement their immediate ideological
preference despite the (possibly only long-term) damage to the
judges' reputation. Like a smoker or failed dieter, the judge cannot forbear from immediate ideological consumption, despite
knowing the long-term harms.93 Justice Scalia's implicit theory
seems to be that judges can lash themselves to the mast by
adopting methodologies like originalism and textualism, which
function as self-binding devices. Perhaps it is easier to stick with
a methodology than to a more general commitment to decide
cases in a neutral way. If all these assumptions are true, then
the determinacy paradox is evaded. Judges act in their enlightened self-interest-advancing their ideological preferences to
some degree while also maintaining their stature in the long
term-by being originalists and textualists. On this interpretation, Justice Scalia's argument is internally consistent: he is
merely giving advice to judges as to how to advance their own
long-run interests.
We provide this argument only for purposes of illustration.
Needless to say, that is not the usual basis on which originalism
and textualism are justified. Moreover, the theory does not seem
plausible to us. But the main point is that whether or not
originalism and textualism can ultimately be justified, any successful justification will have to offer empirical premises that
are consistent with the normative recommendations of the theory. Here too, our concern is not with the substantive merits of
views, but with consistency between premises and conclusions.
B.

Judges and Efficiency

Formalists like Justice Scalia are not the only people who
commit the inside/outside fallacy. It is easy to find examples
among jurists and commentators who believe that judges should
act to advance policy goals. Consider the standard pair of ideas
in the law-and-economics literature that government officials act
in their self-interest and that judges should maximize efficiency
or welfare. Judges are government officials, of course, and so
then the question arises why judges acting in their self-interest
would ever accept the advice to maximize efficiency or welfare.

93 For a related but somewhat different version of these ideas, in which the judge
suffers not from weakness of the will but from a belief that self-binding through rules is
irrational, see Mark Tushnet, Self-Formalism, Precedent, and the Rule of Law, 72 Notre
Dame L Rev 1583, 1584 (1997).
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The puzzle has produced a large but inconclusive literature. 94 One approach is simply to assert that judges somehow lie
outside the rules that apply to everyone else.9@ Perhaps lifetime
tenure enables judges to act in a less self-interested way. But
most common law judges in the United States are subject to
election, and in any event a standard feature of principal-agent
models in economics is that the agent who is not constrained by
a principal will act in her own interest, not in the interest of the
principal or of the public more generally.
The opposite approach is that judge's personal preferences
do not matter because of structural features of litigation. If
judges choose efficient legal rules, parties will settle; only inefficient rules will be subject to the pressures of the litigation process; and rules will eventually become efficient.96 These theories
have been shown to rest on highly fragile assumptions,97 but
even if these assumptions were robust, the theories would not
avoid the inside/outside fallacy. If the evolutionary pressures of
litigation ensure that the law will be efficient, then the advisor
might as well keep silent. Efficiency arises in these models
through an invisible-hand mechanism, not because judges intentionally seek to promote the public interest. The judges in the
model either behave randomly or have no interest in publicspirited advice.
Models of more recent vintage assume more complex motivations for judges. Judges might care about various policy outcomes, minimizing the risk of being overturned, avoiding too
much work, or getting reelected.98 One can avoid the inside/outside fallacy and still make normative recommendations
94 See, for example, Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and Public Judges,
41 Pub Choice 107, 107-08 (1983); Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 Fla St U L Rev 1259, 1260 (2005); Andrei Shleifer,
The Failure of Judges and the Rise of Regulators 11-12 (MIT 2012); Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, The Behaviorof Federal Judges:A Theoretical &
Empirical Study of Rational Choice 25 (Harvard 2013).
95 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 37 (Harvard 2008).
96 See George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient
Rules, 6 J Legal Stud 65, 81 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6
J Legal Stud 51, 61 (1977).
97 See, for example, Robert Cooter and Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve
the Law without the Help of Judges?, 9 J Legal Stud 139, 156 (1980).
98 See, for example, Epstein, Landes, and Posner, The Behavior of Federal Judges
at 48 (cited in note 94); Kirk A. Randazzo, Strategic Anticipation and the Hierarchy of
Justice in U.S. District Courts, 36 Am Pol Rsrch 669, 676-77 (2008); Max M. Schanzenbach and Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines:
Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J L, Econ, & Org 24, 25-26 (2007).
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by assuming that judges at least partly care about advancing
the public interest. The current challenge is to do so in an empirically reasonable way. Here again, the inside/outside fallacy can
be sidestepped, but there is a further question whether the assumptions needed to sidestep it are plausible. Whether or not
they are plausible, identifying the fallacy clarifies the issues by
eliminating inconsistent assumptions that posit one type of behavior for purposes of diagnosis, and a different type of behavior
for purposes of prescription.
C.

Bush v Gore and the Nonprecedent Precedent

Bush v Gore arose out of the disputed presidential election
in 2000. Bush had received more votes than Gore in Florida after the initial count of ballots, but the difference was small. Gore
claimed that the vote count was inaccurate and, after litigation
in the lower courts, persuaded the Florida Supreme Court to order a recount. Bush petitioned the US Supreme Court for what
was effectively a writ of certiorari. The Court held by a seven to
two vote that the Florida Supreme Court's ruling violated the
Equal Protection Clause. A five-to-four majority ordered a halt
to the recount, which gave Bush his victory.
The seven-justice majority focused on the procedures-or,
really, lack of procedures-that the Florida Supreme Court directed state officials to use in the recount of the ballots.99 As Professor David Strauss has noted, the Court's holding can be interpreted as establishing a principle "that at least where the
right to vote is concerned, the states may not use discretionary
standards if it is practicable to formulate rules that will limit
discretion."oo However, this principle would have been greatly at
variance with the judicial philosophies of the five conservative
justices, who had generally deferred to the states on matters of
voting.o1 Possibly for this reason, the opinion includes this famous sentence: "Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities."102 While one could
interpret this statement as merely cautioning courts in future

cases that the Supreme Court did not have adequate time to
99

See Bush, 531 US at 109.

100 David A. Strauss, Bush v Gore: What Were

They Thinking?, 68 U Chi L Rev 737,

750 (2001).
101 See Bush, 531 US at 139-41 (Ginsburg dissenting).
102 Id at 109 (majority).
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think through the implications of its holding, most commentators have argued that the Court meant to deny Bush v Gore
precedential value,103 and we will assume that this latter interpretation is correct.
The conservative justices faced the same problem that Justice Jackson did in the Korematsu case, discussed earlier. They
wanted the case to come out in a certain way but did not want
the outcome to serve as a precedent for future rulings. For Justice Jackson, the problem was how to avoid defying the military
in the particular case, which may have led to a politically damaging showdown, without establishing a precedent that the president can intern American citizens whenever he believes that
they pose a threat to security. For the five-justice majority in
Bush v Gore, the problem was how to ensure that Bush would
prevai104 without establishing a precedent that any voting regime that relies on discretionary standards is constitutionally
suspect-a precedent that might, in their view, have been unwise as a purely jurisprudential matter, or merely unpredictable, or possibly harmful for Republicans.
We argued before that Justice Jackson's approach was
doomed to fail because, even under his approach, a judicial refusal to interfere with military decisionmaking in Korematsu
would have established a small-c constitutional precedent. However, we could not provide any direct evidence, because of the
counterfactual quality of the issue. Justice Jackson's opinion
was not the majority opinion, so it could not establish even a
small-c precedent. The majority opinion in Korematsu is now

103 See, for example, Guido Calabresi, In Partial(but Not Partisan)Praiseof Principle, in Bruce Ackerman, ed, Bush v. Gore: The Question of Legitimacy 67, 80 (Yale 2002)
(deeming the opinion "designed to self-destruct"); Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U Chi L Rev 637, 650 (2001) (describing the opinion as "the classic 'good for
this train, and this train only' offer").
104 Many scholars believe that the majority had a nakedly political goal. See, for example, Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary between Law and Politics, 110
Yale L J 1407, 1409 (2001); Margaret Jane Radin, Can the Rule of Law Survive Bush v.
Gore?, in Ackerman, ed, Question of Legitimacy 110, 114 (cited in note 103). Others believe that they were justified in taking extraconstitutional steps to end a disputed election. See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Breaking the Deadlock: The 2000 Election, the
Constitution, and the Courts 150 (Princeton 2001); John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's
Legitimacy, 68 U Chi L Rev 775, 776 (2001). A middle position is that the majority believed that the Florida Supreme Court sought to throw the election for the Democrats,
and saw no other way to stop them. See Strauss, 68 U Chi L Rev at 751-55 (cited in note
100) (addressing but rejecting this argument).
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generally regarded as bad law; courts are reluctant to cite it; the
case has, in effect, been overturned.105
Bush v Gore provides a better test case because the precedent-limiting language appears in the majority opinion. A number of scholars initially predicted that despite the limiting language, the equal protection rule would have precedential
value.106 Others disputed this prediction.107 In fact, the evidence
has borne out the prediction.108 A number of lower courts have
cited Bush v Gore in the course of striking down election statutes. Although some of the initial rulings were overturned on
appeal or reversed by en banc panels,109 in recent years Bush v
Gore has provided the basis for a number of final judgments.11o
For example, a federal court struck down an Ohio law that restricted early voting for everyone except military voters, reasoning that the distinction between the two types of voters could not
be justified under the principle of Bush v Gore."' The same
court, also citing Bush v Gore, affirmed a preliminary injunction
against an Ohio law that made the validity of a ballot cast in the
wrong location depend on the type of identification used by the
voter.112 Thus, the limiting language of Bush v Gore failed to
have its intended effect.
The reason is that the Court acted within a system in which
any statement or judgment by the Court has precedential value.
1os See, for example, David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and
Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 Mich L Rev 2565, 2575 (2003).
106 See Charles Fried, An Unreasonable Reaction to a Reasonable Decision, in Ackerman, ed, Question of Legitimacy 3, 15 (cited in note 103) (describing the Court's "caveat" as
simply "boilerplate"); Owen Fiss, The Fallibility of Reason, in Ackerman, ed, Question of
Legitimacy 84, 88 (cited in note 103) (deeming the disclaimer "commonplace").
107 See note 103 and accompanying text.
108 Compare Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 Stan L Rev
1, 6-15 (2007), with Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, JudicialBackstops, and
the Resurrection of Bush v. Gore, 81 Geo Wash L Rev *11-27 (forthcoming 2013), online
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2182857 (visited Nov 24, 2013).
The latter paper shows that lower courts have begun to use Bush v Gore as a precedent
in important cases, and the Supreme Court has been unwilling or unable to stop them.
109 See, for example, Southwest Voter Registration Education Project v Shelley, 344
F3d 882, 894 (9th Cir 2003), vacd en banc 344 F3d 914 (9th Cir 2003); Stewart v Blackwell, 444 F3d 843, 859 (6th Cir 2006), vacd and superseded en banc 473 F3d 692 (6th Cir
2007). These "punch card" cases are discussed in greater depth in Hasen, 60 Stan L Rev
at 9-15 (cited in note 108).
110 See, for example, Obamafor America v Husted, 888 F Supp 2d 897, 905 (SD Ohio
2012), affd 697 F3d 423 (6th Cir 2012); Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v
Husted, 696 F3d 580, 598 (6th Cir 2012).
M1 Obama for America, 888 F Supp 2d at 905.
112 Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless, 696 F3d at 598, 604. See also Hasen,
The 2012 Voting Wars, 81 Geo Wash L Rev at *2 (cited in note 108).
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Lower courts try to predict how the Supreme Court will react to
their decisions; its past behavior is the best clue. And where
there is a conflict within a single opinion-here, between the
judgment and the limiting language-the judgment provides the
better guide for the future because it reflects an outcome rather
than mere talk. It is reasonable for lower courts to assume that
cases with facts legally indistinguishable from those of Bush v
Gore will be decided in the same way-unless, to be sure, the
Supreme Court's decision was partisan, but lower courts could
not ignore a precedent on those grounds, even implicitly. The
Court could not suspend the rules of precedent for one case because the rules of precedent are rules of the system in which the
Court acts. Similar issues arise with respect to "unpublished"
opinions, which are sometimes cited by later litigants or courts,
contrary to the intentions of the issuing court. 13
As in Justice Jackson's Korematsu opinion, the Court's mistake here rests on a nonobvious version of the determinacy paradox. Fearing that downstream courts would use a precedent in
ways the majority would not approve, the majority in effect
commanded those courts to ignore the decision. But the majority's positive theory of the motivations of downstream courts and
the majority's command or prescription were pragmatically inconsistent. Given the posited motivation on the part of downstream courts, those courts will also have every reason to ignore
the command, and to take the original decision into account the
way they take other decisions into account. The attempt by the
Bush v Gore majority to deny precedential effect to its own decision thus rested on a self-refuting theory of the motivations of
the actors it attempted to bind.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW

Inside/outside fallacies also appear in debates about international law. International law bears more than a passing resemblance to constitutional law because, like constitutional law,
it establishes the norms that govern the behavior of institutions

113 See, for example, Patrick J. Schiltz, The Citation of Unpublished Opinions in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 74 Fordham L Rev 23, 43-47 (2005) (arguing that judges and
lawyers rely on unpublished opinions as sources of precedent, whether or not courts
permit those opinions to be cited). As of 2006, federal courts of appeals are required to
permit parties to cite unpublished opinions. See FRAP 32.1(a).
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while depending on those institutions to enforce those norms.114
It is this double nature that provides fertile soil for inside/outside fallacies. We will focus on the example of humanitarian intervention, and then more briefly show how this problem appears in other areas of international law.
A.

Humanitarian Intervention

The UN Charter forbids states to use military force except
in self-defense or with the authorization of the Security Council.11 It contains no exception for so-called humanitarian intervention, where a state uses military force to protect a foreign
population from abuses by its own government. In theory, the
Security Council may authorize a humanitarian intervention-it
did so to prevent Muammar Qaddafi from massacring Libyan
rebels and civilians in 2011.116 But the Security Council is usually reluctant to authorize warfare.117
In the years leading up to the 1999 military intervention in
Serbia, ethnic Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo had
launched an insurgency, with the goal of obtaining autonomy
from the Serbian government. The Serbian government responded with harsh military reprisals, and by 1999 a campaign
to drive ethnic Albanian Kosovars out of the country, a form of
ethnic cleansing or possibly even genocide. Efforts were made to
obtain Security Council authorization for an international military intervention to protect the Kosovars and expel Serbian military forces from the province, but they ran into resistance from
Russia, a traditional ally of Serbia and the possessor of a veto on
the Security Council. Nonetheless, the United States led other
NATO countries in an air attack on Serbian troops and installations, which ultimately defeated Serbia."1s

114 See Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson, Law for States: InternationalLaw, ConstitutionalLaw, Public Law, 122 Harv L Rev 1791, 1794 (2009).
115 UN Charter Art 2(4) ("All members shall refrain ... from the threat or use of
force."); UN Charter Art 39 (UN authorization); UN Charter Art 51 (self-defense exception).
116 See generally Resolution 1973, UN Security Council, 6498th mtg (Mar 17, 2011),

UN Doc S/RES/1973.
117 See Jules Lobel and Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council:Ambiguous
Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 Am J Intl L
124, 134 (1999).
118 See The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report:
Conflict, InternationalResponse, Lessons Learned 67-97 (Oxford 2000).
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The military intervention clearly violated international
law.119 The Security Council had failed to authorize it, and the
self-defense exception did not apply because Kosovo was not an
independent country that had been invaded. A commission was
established to evaluate the war and, in the end, came to the conclusion that the war was "illegal but legitimate."120 This formulation meant that the law violation was morally justified. It
seemed to satisfy commentators who opposed legalizing humanitarian intervention because of the fear that such an exception to
the UN regime would enable states to rationalize predatory
wars by pointing to human rights violations in the target state,
yet who also believed that the 1999 intervention was in fact justified.121 By maintaining the posture of illegality, this stance deters countries from engaging in war except when the humanitarian purpose is genuine.
But the argument is questionable. If the Kosovo intervention was legitimate, then any humanitarian intervention under
similar conditions is legitimate. In future cases, states that
launch invasions will be able to point to Kosovo as a moral if not
legal precedent, and be able to argue that since the Kosovo intervention was permitted, their interventions should be as
well.122 If the reason to avoid a legal precedent is that states can
rationalize predatory interventions by pointing out similarities
to past humanitarian interventions despite their different motivations, the same problem will apply to a moral precedent as
well. So while the legal system remains "pure," the practical effect of its purity is nil. The rules of "legitimacy" or morality supersede the legal rules, reproducing the problem of ambiguity at
a higher plane, and so one does not really escape the system; one
just redefines it using different words.
The inside/outside fallacy is only implicit, as in the case of
presidential emergency power, but just as real. The behavioral
premise from an external perspective is that states seek to maximize

119 See id at 4.
120 Id.

121 See Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International
Legitimation of Forcible HumanitarianCountermeasures in the World Community?, 10
Eur J Intl L 23, 27 (1999); Nico Krisch, Legality, Morality and the Dilemma of HumanitarianIntervention after Kosovo, 13 Eur J Intl L 323, 327 (2002); Anne Orford, Muscular
Humanitarianism:Reading the Narratives of the New Interventionism, 10 Eur J Intl L
679, 680 (1999).
122 See The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report at
173 (cited in note 118).
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power; that is why they need to be constrained by a legal system
that does not create a loophole for military attacks that can be
rationalized as humanitarian interventions. Yet within the internal perspective states are urged to launch humanitarian interventions for moral reasons that are inconsistent with the behavioral premises. The effort to escape the dilemma by positing
a plane of morality or legitimacy that supersedes the plane of legality entangles the analyst in the fallacy.
B.

The Problem of International Legal Change

International law lacks an institution like a legislature
through which the law can be revised and changed. When states
seek to change international law, the most reliable method is to
call a convention, to which all states send delegates. The convention may produce a draft treaty, and then the treaty becomes
law if and when states ratify it. As a result of this cumbersome
process, international law can easily become out of date and
hence is fragile, as states may find themselves bound to rules
that no longer serve their interests.
However, there is another mechanism for legal changeunilateral action on the part of one state followed by general acquiescence by the others. The classic example is President Harry
S. Truman's continental shelf announcement. In 1945, President
Truman announced that henceforth the United States would regard the continental shelf abutting US territory as under its exclusive jurisdiction.123 This announcement was a violation of international law, or at least portended violation, as international
law at the time regarded the continental shelf beyond the territorial sea as under the jurisdiction of no country. 124
However, rather than object to the Truman announcement,
other countries made similar claims about their own continental
shelves, and over time a consensus emerged that states had exclusive jurisdiction over their continental shelves. Under general
principles of international law, norms qualify as international
law when states regard them as legal norms and act consistently
123 Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil
and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, Presidential Proclamation 2667, 10 Fed Reg
12303, 12305 (Sept 28, 1945).
124 See United Nations Office of Legal Affairs Division for Ocean Affairs and the
Law of the Sea, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Historical Perspective (United Nations 1998), online at http://www.un.orgfDepts/los/convention
agreements/convention historicalperspective.htm (visited Nov 24, 2013).
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with them.125 This test was satisfied, and so US policy was no
longer in violation of the law. Many decades later, states ratified
the Law of the Sea Treaty, which confirmed the legality of the
new norm. 126
Most commentators regard the Truman announcement as illegal, like the Kosovo intervention.127 The problem with this view
is that illegality provides a presumption against action: if states
are told that some action violates international law, that means
they should not engage in it. Yet why would one tell President
Truman not to engage in an action that would end up benefiting
the world? One should instead say that the legality of President
Truman's action depended on the future reactions of other
states. It would turn out to be legal if other states approved of it;
otherwise, it would turn out to be illegal. There is an analogy in
common law development. An act that might seem obviously illegal under common law precedents may be deemed legal by a
court that for policy reasons decides to overrule or distinguish
those precedents. A lawyer advising a client who was thinking
about embarking on this act would need to predict the court's
ruling in order to advise the client, taking into account the policy considerations that might influence the court in a future case.
But international lawyers have resisted this understanding of
change in customary international law,128 no doubt because they
fear that this understanding would make it too easy for states to
violate customary international law on the basis of pretextual
justifications. But then we are back to the fallacy, where one
simultaneously insists on absolute compliance with the law
based on the premise that states act in a self-interested way,
while encouraging states to deviate from bad law for publicspirited reasons.

125 Id.
126 See

Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art 77, 1833 UNTS 397 (Dec 10, 1982,
entered into force Nov 16, 1994).
127 See, for example, Eric A. Posner and Alan 0. Sykes, Efficient Breach of Interna-

tional Law: Optimal Remedies, "Legalized Noncompliance," and Related Issues, 110 Mich
L Rev 243, 287 (2011); Jonathan I. Charney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the
United States Government to Violate Customary InternationalLaw, 80 Am J Intl L 913,
915 & n 8 (1986).
128 The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report at 174
(cited in note 118).
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V. THEMES AND SOLUTIONS
Across these examples, the common setting involves a system, that is, a group of agents who interact with each other according to a set of rules and produce some outcome.129 Someone
standing outside the system (for example, an academic) proposes
a theory as to why the agents interact as they do, observes that
the outcome is socially undesirable or suboptimal in some way,
and then makes a normative proposal as to how the agents
should change their behavior so as to improve the outcome. The
classic example is Madisonian judging. The analyst first argues
that branches of government or the officials within those
branches seek to maximize their power (the behavioral premise)
and then argues that judges should maintain a balance of power
between the executive and the legislative branches (the normative proposal). The contradiction is that if judges too maximize
their power, then they will have no reason to produce a socially
desirable outcome except in the event that the socially optimal
outcome results from their power-maximization-in which case
there is no reason to make a normative argument (except insofar
as the analyst can give the actors advice or information about
how best to pursue their own interests, an exception to be discussed below).
A variation arises when an agent within the system makes
the proposal. As we have seen, judges make the same Madisonian argument, first citing Madison for the proposition that
branches or officials are power-maximizers and then arguing
that they should balance the power of all branches rather than
maximize the power of their own. The contradiction here is more
acute than in the case of the analyst. For here, by accepting
Madisonian premises, the judges are saying in effect that they
are maximizing their power, even while they claim that they are
acting in the public interest. External analysts might be making
inconsistent assumptions but they are at least not refuting their
own claim to sincerity.
Another set of examples involves agents who seek to cabin
the effect of their actions, in violation of the underlying rules of
the system. If people act on the basis of predictions as to how
judges will make decisions, then judges cannot simultaneously
129 This definition encompasses the case of two-level systems, in which interactions
between individuals create institutions that then interact with one another. See Vermeule, The System of the Constitution at 27 (cited in note 12).
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make a decision and claim that it will not be repeated in the future. Here, judges implicitly admit that people will be influenced
by their decisions, while attempting to assert that they should
not be influenced by their decisions. Similarly, when constitutional and international law change, agents are simultaneously
arguing that everyone should follow the law and that a particular form of lawbreaking is justified because of its socially beneficial effects. From an external perspective, people follow the law;
from an internal perspective, people should disregard the law
when an emerging new law would be superior.
As we have seen, the literature on the determinacy paradox
in welfare economics makes the same point, although in other
settings. We understand the determinacy paradox to be analytically coterminous with the inside/outside fallacy; these are different ways to describe the same problem. We prefer the latter
description because it underscores that, in such cases, the analyst confuses internal and external perspectives-traditionally a
central issue for legal theory.13o From the external perspective,
the analyst seeks to explain the behavior of agents inside the
system. From the internal perspective, the analyst takes the
viewpoint of the agents and asks how the agent should behave
so as to improve outcomes. If the external perspective is correct,
then it is hard to see how agents will act any differently from
the way they do, in which case they will not heed advice as to
how they should change their behavior-except insofar as the
analyst can offer instrumental information or tactical advice
about how actors should best pursue their interests. The analyst
should propose that the rules of the system be changed, not that
agents within the system change their behavior; and the analyst
must then confront the further question whether any relevant
actors have both the capacity and motivation to change the rules
of the system. If the internal perspective is correct, however,
then the behavioral premises of the external perspective must
seem wrong or at least questionable.
It is not possible to avoid the methodological problems by
characterizing arguments of this sort as "ideal theory." In these
arguments, the very problem is that the analyst combines ideal
with nonideal theory in an inconsistent fashion. The analyst attributes nonideal motivations to the agents or actors within the
130 See Hart, The Concept of Law at 86-88 (cited in note 2); Fallon, 97 Cal L Rev at
995-1002 (cited in note 2).
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system for purposes of diagnosis, and then attributes idealized
motivations to those same agents or actors for purposes of advice
giving and prescription. Either an ideal or a nonideal approach
would be coherent taken by itself, and applied consistently to
both diagnosis and prescription, but the combination falls between two stools.
Are there ways out of this methodological dilemma? We can
think of four.
Aligning the perspectives. One solution is to stipulate that

people in the system have the same public-regarding preferences
as the outside analyst. Consider a theory of judging, according to
which judges are assumed to have public-regarding preferences,
and the outside analyst appeals to those preferences in the
course of urging judges to improve the law, constrain the executive, or take any similar action. Judges would no longer be able
to cite Madison. Instead, they would simply assert that they can
maintain the balance of power between the executive and the
legislature because they, unlike the political branches, have the
proper incentives.
A more modest and plausible version of this argument is
that even if judges do not have perfectly public-regarding preferences, the norms of judicial practice are different from those that
govern legislative and executive behavior. Perhaps judges internalize the principle of judicial neutrality or fear reputational
sanctions from the legal community, or from the public. Even
though officials who appoint judges (or the voters that elect
them) may have partisan motives for choosing particular judges,
everyone may expect that, once in office, judges will respect
norms of neutrality, at least to a greater degree than other political agents would. Thus, judges are receptive to public-regarding
arguments made by outside analysts, at least some of the time.
Both of these arguments avoid the inside/outside fallacy, but
that does not mean they are correct. The first argument ignores
the massive literature on judicial behavior, which provides empirical evidence of ideological or strategic judging at least on the
margin. The second argument incorporates that literature but in
an ad hoc way. Indeed, the literature suggests that judges are
most likely to be ideological in high-stakes cases,13 1 and among
the high-stakes cases are those in which judges are called on to
131 See Isaac Unah and Ange-Marie Hancock, U.S. Supreme Court Decision Making,
Case Salience, and the Attitudinal Model, 28 L & Pol 295, 309 (2006); Paul M. Collins Jr,
The Consistency of Judicial Choice, 70 J Polit 861, 868 (2008).
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arbitrate disputes between the executive and legislative branches. Our point, however, is not that it is empirically impossible
for judges to act neutrally; it is, rather, that scholars typically
fail to make well-thought-out empirical assumptions. They instead proceed with unconscious assumptions about judges standing outside the system, assumptions that are inconsistent, or at
best not obviously consistent, with other assumptions those very
scholars make about the incentives of other officials.
Or consider yet another approach, according to which people
are "normally" self-regarding or power-maximizing but on occasion can be roused to take public-spirited action. Suppose, for
example, that people act in a self-regarding way 95 percent of
the time, and in a public-spirited way 5 percent of the time. One
might then argue that the analyst who assumes that people are
self-regarding but makes public-spirited proposals is on firm
ground, as even if the recipients of the argument ignore them 95
percent of the time, at least 5 percent of the time they will advance the public good.
The problem with this argument stems from the theory of
the second best, which we mentioned earlier. Consider the Madisonian theory, where it was regarded as urgent for judges to
maximize power so as to oppose self-aggrandizement by the executive and legislative branches. If the Madisonian theory is
correct, then judges should power-maximize even in the periods
in which they are public-regarding-that is, public-spirited motives should cause them to act as if they were powermaximizing. In other contexts, there are other problems. Under
Professors Pildes and Levinson's theory, for example, we would
need to address all kinds of empirical complexities-whether, for
example, legislative and executive officials sometimes act in a
public-spirited way, and how that should affect the actions of
judges. We would need to explain why the balance of selfish and
other-regarding behavior exhibited by public officials favors the
Pildes-Levinson prescription (strict review by occasionally public-regarding judges of normally self-interested legislation when
government is unified) rather than the opposite (deferential review by occasionally self-interested judges of occasionally publicregarding legislation when government is unified). As before, we
do not deny that some theory, some just-right stipulation of
premises, could revitalize these arguments; our point is that the
authors do not supply such a theory.
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Agents can temporarily exit the system. Another escape from
the dilemma is to assume that people can temporarily exit the
system for the purpose of evaluating and revising it. International law demands compliance from states, but from time to
time states can disregard this demand so long as they take the
proper attitude toward it, for example, one of disinterested criticism in the spirit of international cooperation. The analyst cannot influence judges within the system but can advocate a
change in the rules of the system. A flavor of this idea can be
found in Professor Bruce Ackerman's theory of constitutional
moments, according to which constitutional change can take
place outside the formal channels of amendment when the public is aroused by events and attentive to constitutional issues.132

Lawbreaking during extraordinary moments does not degrade
the law during normal times. Within-system behavior occurs
during normal times, when agents are assumed to act in their
self-interest; outside-system behavior occurs during emergencies
or other special periods, when agents are willing to act in a more
public-spirited fashion.as
This approach avoids the inside/outside fallacy but at the
price of invoking a deus ex machina. How exactly are people able
to extract themselves from the system? A more satisfying account is one that explains how people are capable of acting both
normally and extraordinarily. One might argue, for example,
that the small-c constitution (or body of international law) accepts lawbreaking that is subsequently validated by popular (or
sovereign) consensus. But this is just an awkward way of saying
that such lawbreaking behavior is not lawbreaking at all, or is
so only contingent on subsequent events turning out in a certain
way. This approach forces one to confront clearly the risk that
the inside/outside evasion was meant to avoid in the first place:
that once people accept that lawbreaking may be normatively
justified for consequential reasons, the law loses its authority,
and people break the law more often for bad reasons than for
good reasons.
132 See Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the People: Foundations6-7 (Belknap 1991).
133 Interestingly, Professor Ackerman abandons this view for security emergencies,
urging Congress to adopt a framework statute to constrain a possibly ill-motivated executive. See Ackerman, Before the Next Attack at 4-5 (cited in note 88). As Professor Jon
Elster has pointed out, it is typical of constitutional moments that they take place during
emergencies; only then are people aroused enough to debate fundamental law. See Jon

Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 Duke L J 364,
370-71, 394-95 (1995).
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One can, as noted, also argue that any agent can advocate a
change in the system itself. A judge might argue that current incentives for judges are bad and therefore the constitution should
be changed. Many judges and other commentators make just
this argument about, for example, judicial elections or lifetime
tenure.18 4 But while this approach is superficially attractive, it
does not really overcome the underlying difficulty. If, for example, tenure enables judges to indulge their ideological preferences, then why should we expect them to do anything different
if they participate as citizens in the process of constitutional reform? Won't they pursue constitutional rules that benefit them
even more? Again, one must assume that during temporary periods agents can somehow overcome the incentives that animate
them during "normal times." Perhaps that is true, but the assumptions underlying the claim must be carefully spelled out to
avoid the dilemmas we have mentioned.
The ad hoc stipulation. In Justice Jackson's opinion in Korematsu, and the per curiam opinion in Bush v Gore, the ad hoc
stipulation is used by an agent inside the system to attempt to
cabin the precedential effect of its behavior when it purports to
act outside the system. Justice Jackson purported to act outside
the system by claiming that a decision favoring the military
should be rendered so as to avoid establishing a precedent. The
per curiam opinion in Bush v Gore purported to act outside the
system by asserting that a decision that would normally have
precedential effect would have no such effect.
Consider the theory that the Bush v Gore decision was a
kind of judicial coup d'6tat. The court stepped outside its normal
role as constitutional adjudicator in order to hand the election to
Bush, or at least ensure that he would not lose on a recount.
Taking the most sympathetic view to the majority, we might
suppose that the court acted properly either to avoid a constitutional crisis or to prevent the Florida Supreme Court from
throwing the election to Gore.as We might read the majority as
stipulating that it will act again only in a crisis-that is why it
would be improper to read the equal protection holding as precedent
134

See, for example, Sandra Day O'Connor, Foreword, in James Sample, et al, The

New Politics of Judicial Elections, 2000-2009: Decade of Change i (Brennan Center for
Justice 2010); Jamal Greene, Term Limits for FederalJudges (NY Times July 8, 2012), online at
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/07/08/another-stab-at-the-us-constitution/
revisiting-the-constitution-we-need-term-limits-for-federal-judges (visited Nov 24, 2013).
135 See Posner, Breaking the Deadlock at 150 (cited in note 104); Strauss, 68 U Chi L
Rev at 755 (cited in note 100).
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for future "normal" cases. But it could not say so explicitly without risking its own credibility-perhaps, people would accept the
Court's resolution of the crisis only if they believed the equal
protection rationale.
If all this is true, one might interpret the inside/outside fallacy not so much as a logical conundrum as an illustration of the
constraints of public reason. It may be that public officials can
leave the system; the problem is that they cannot say they are
doing so without subverting their goals. The two international
law examples also illustrate this idea: states publicly declare
their allegiance to international law and then argue that law violations represent extreme and unrepresentative deviations that
are confined to their facts, as lawyers would say, and do not undermine the system of international law itself. The noble lie,
which we discussed in the context of Professor Issacharoff and
Pildes's defense of authorizing statutes, is a version of this problem. It seems to us questionable that noble lies can be maintained for any period of time,136 especially in the case of interna-

tional relations where states are both the speakers and the
audience; and it is difficult to defend them in a democratic system.
Producing information. The most coherent and intellectually satisfying response to the inside/outside fallacy is to cut back
on the ambitions of the analyst. Rather than claim (for example)
that agents are self-interested and that nonetheless they should
heed the analyst's public-spirited advice, the analyst can limit
himself to advice that agents will follow because it advances
their self-interest. For example, without succumbing to the fallacy, an analyst could instruct judges to neutrally balance the
executive and legislative branch, because if they instead followed the Madisonian prescription of expanding their power,
they would lose public support.13 7 Power-maximizing judges
would heed the analyst's advice because it turns out that the
best way to maximize (or at least, maintain) their power is to
serve as honest brokers.
The main problem with this approach is the analyst's ability to
make public-spirited advice may be scaled down to such a degree
136 But see Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv L Rev 625, 665-77 (1983) (arguing that the lawmakers
can deliberately and successfully design the law to say different things to different audiences). We believe that this is possible only in a fragile and temporary way; over the long
run, people are not fooled.
137 See Part I.A.
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as to cease to exist altogether. The opportunity to make such advice depends on a happy confluence of events-where it turns
out to be in an agent's self-interest to act in the public interest,
and, for whatever reason, the agent is unaware of this fact. Still,
it is easy to think of examples. Academic experts in constitutional design may be able to supply local actors with useful comparative information when those actors are engineering a new
constitution.1s Critics of the Bush administration's torture policies argued, among other things, that torture is self-defeating
because it causes the subject of interrogation to lie, or because

any advantage is offset by harm to the country's reputation.1as
All rule-utilitarian arguments have a flavor of this approach. An
act that benefits society in the short-term has negative longterm consequences; therefore, the government should comply
with a rule that forbids such acts, despite the sometimes overwhelming temptation to the contrary. The role of the analyst is
merely to remind the government of those long-term consequences, or to propose ingenious mechanisms of self-binding
that will allow officials to pursue their enlightened long-run
self-interests, rather than short-run interests.
The most important version of this approach is the argument that a legal or constitutional reform will produce a Paretosuperior allocation of resources. 40 Consider, for example, fre-

quent proposals to reform the filibuster, which can be used by
the minority party in the Senate to block legislation that it disapproves of. Filibuster reform usually fails because the minority

party has no reason to give up this power to protect itself, and
the majority party wants to retain the filibuster so that it can
protect itself next time it is in the minority.141 The best proposals
for filibuster reform argue that, in fact, both parties misperceive

138 See Tushnet, 49 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1487 (cited in note 5) (discussing narrow
conditions under which this is possible).
139 See, for example, Darius Rejali, Torture and Democracy 24 (Princeton 2009);
Jean Maria Arrigo, A UtilitarianArgument against Torture Interrogation of Terrorists,
10 Sci Engineering Ethics 543, 544 (2004).
140 For this argument in the economic literature, see Stephen Coate, An Efficiency
Approach to the Evaluation of Policy Changes *20-21 (NBER Working Paper No 7316,
Aug 1999), online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7316 (visited Nov 24, 2013), who argues that economists should propose Pareto-superior projects on the assumption that
political agents will believe that such projects will be in their self-interest; in the same
spirit, see Avinash Dixit, Economists as Advisers to Politiciansand Society, 9 Econ & Pol
225, 228-29 (1997).
141 See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Senate: Out of Order?, 43 Conn L Rev 1041,
1054 (2011).
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their interests and would benefit over time if they can legislate
more often (even if one side loses) than if they cannot.142 This
could be the case if, for example, gridlock in the Senate hurts
both parties and clears the way for the rise of a third party.
Whether this is in fact true or not is an empirical question, but
at least the reform proposal does not fall prey to the determinacy paradox.
CONCLUSION
The inside/outside fallacy results when analysts or agents
do not think carefully about whether their normative proposals,
offered from an internal perspective, are consistent with their
empirical premises, offered from an external perspective. We do
not argue that the inside/outside fallacy-legal theory's version
of the determinacy paradox-is a necessary feature of academic
research, or of real-world systems where agents within a system
are expected to improve the system as well. Nothing in our argument is substantive, or empirical; we urge no particular assumptions about the behavior of judges or other actors. Rather,
our argument is about consistency.
The fallacy occurs again and again in legal scholarship,
probably because it is so difficult to reconcile the tradition of
providing normative recommendations to judges and legislators
with the behavioral premises of economics, psychology, and political science, which have had such great influence in the last
forty years. If one can predict how judges will decide cases based
on exogenous factors such as the party of the president who appointed them, then what is the point of urging them to strike
down or uphold Roe v Wadel43 on the basis of impartial legal considerations? To be sure, one might want or might not want to
supply them with straight-faced, legally respectable rationales
for the view they will want to adopt anyway, but that is a different sort of enterprise.
Judges are not machines, and it is empirically possible that
they will be receptive to certain types of normative arguments,
as we have argued throughout. But then the analyst must be
clear that those normative arguments are not based on empirical premises that are at variance with the analyst's own assumptions about judicial behavior. Once again, we are making a
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methodological argument about how legal scholars frequently
make inconsistent assumptions; we are not making a substantive argument that "all judges are political" or "all people act in
their self-interest" and therefore that it is never worth making
public-regarding arguments to them. And thus we are not condemning all legal scholarship, but simply urging scholars to be
aware of the way the inside/outside paradox demands greater
methodological clarity.
It follows from what we have said that political science and
law may have less to say to one another than many constitutional theorists currently suppose. Or, less pessimistically, talk
across disciplines constantly threatens to descend into incoherence unless the conversational parties are careful to tidy up
their premises. The enterprise of explaining the behavior of actors from the external standpoint is difficult to combine in a coherent way with the enterprise of offering those actors sympathetic advice internal to the morality of the roles the actors
adopt. At a minimum, analysts who speak both as political scientists and as legal theorists must be careful not to switch their
hats so rapidly that they end up attempting to wear two hats at
the same time. The demands of intellectual coherence are that
legal theorists must make clear, at any given moment, whether
they are adopting an external or internal standpoint, and must
ensure that their assumptions about the motivations, beliefs,
and opportunities of relevant actors are consistent across positive and normative arguments.

